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included in this issue.
Fi j i
Fiji seemed to come full circle in 2 0 0 1.
The year began with the nation ner-
vously awaiting the outcome of a
Court of Appeal hearing on the fate
of the interim government installed
after the 2000 coup. It ended in a
similar way, with the same Court of
Appeal preparing to rule on the future
of the newly elected government of
Laisenia Qarase. Throughout 2001,
Fiji’s political course followed surpris-
ing and at times startling directions,
as the country picked its way through
the debris and rubble left by the crisis
of 2000.
The legal challenge to the interim
government had come when dairy
farmer Chandrika Prasad, whose
prope rty was stolen and family terror-
ized after the coup in May 2000, suc-
cessfully obtained a ruling in the 
High Court in November 2000 that
declared the 1997 constitution extant
and the interim government without
any legal basis. The government
appealed the ruling to the Court of
Appeal because, as Interim Prime
Minister Qarase explained, “We need
confirmation so that we can progress
Fiji further towards parliamentary
democracy” (Post, 28 Feb 2001, 3).
The lead-up to the Court of Appeal
hearing in February was marked by
heightened tensions, as nationalist
Fijian leaders warned of bloodshed
and chaos should the ruling go against
the interim government. Ema Drua-
vesi, a spokeswoman for the former
governing party (Soqosoqo ni Vaka-
vulewa ni Taukei, or svt ) predicted
that “if you force the Gates (High
Court) judgement upon the Fijian
people against their will our chances
of returning to democracy will be
destroyed for a long time” (Sun, 18
Jan 2001, 1). In an unusual show of
unity, Fijian political parties issued a
joint statement demanding the contin-
uation of the interim government.
They warned that any attempts to
“derail Fijian leadership” would be
strongly resisted. Meanwhile the
Taukei Movement was reported to 
be mobilizing its supporters to oppose
the reinstatement of the 1997 consti-
tution. Provincial councils and chiefs
also denounced the intervention by
the courts. According to one chief:
“We will die defending the President
and Interim Government against
rulings detrimental to us as a race”
(Times, 26 Jan 2001, 3). 
While a Fiji Times editorial dis-
missed such threats as “empty politi-
cal posturing,” it pointed to the mili-
tary as being the final arbiter of the
interim government’s and hence
nation’s future. There were indica-
tions, in an army briefing to the presi-
dent leaked to the media, that the
military intended to “uphold the rule
of law—even if that means upholding
the Gates ru l i n g” (T i m e s , 2 4 J a n 2 0 0 1,
1). However, army statements also
reaffirmed its “steadfast support” for
the president and interim government,
and the position that national security
remained its “paramount concern.”
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It was in this atmosphere of tension
and uncertainty that the Court of
Appeal began its hearing on 19 Feb-
ruary. The interim government’s case
was that the 1997 constitution had
indeed been abrogated according to
the doctrine of necessity—to avert
further threats to peace and security;
and that a new legal order was now
in effective control, commanding the
acceptance if not approval of a wide
section of the population. The respon-
dents (Chandrika Prasad’s lawyers)
claimed that there was no necessity for
the purported abrogation of the con-
stitution—that such a step was “irra-
tional and disproportionate.” They
further argued that no new legal or
political order was in place (the fact
that the interim government had sub-
mitted to the courts was evidence of
that). Nor was the interim govern m e n t
in effective control, since it lacked
both legal and political legitimacy.
In a landmark ruling handed down
on 1 M a rch 2 0 0 1 the Court of Appeal
dismissed the interim government’s
appeal. It declared that the 1997
constitution remained the supreme
law of the country; that parliament
was not dissolved but prorogued for
six months; and that the office of
president only became vacant on 15
December 2000 with the resignation
of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Accord-
ingly, Ratu Josefa Iloilo was still act-
ing in the position. The court argued
that that there was no justification for
abrogation of the constitution, and
that the interim government had failed
to demonstrate or prove effective con-
trol. One of the lawyers representing
C h a n d r i k a P r a s ad d e s c r i b ed t h e c o u rt ’s
ruling as historic and setting a power-
ful precedent. “It is the first time that
a court decision may restore a demo-
cratically elected parliament displaced
by a coup d’etat” (Post, 7 Mar 2001,
2). However, the Court of Appeal had
not ruled on how the democratically
elected parliament should be restored,
and it was this question that con-
founded commentators and political
parties in the immediate aftermath of
the ruling. 
As a way of buying time and per-
haps legitimacy, the acting president
and interim government announced
that they would seek guidance from
the Great Council of Chiefs before
making their next move. Although
pledging publicly to abide by the
court’s ruling, the interim government
showed no immediate sign of relin-
quishing power (much to the Labour
Party’s chagrin). When the Great
Council of Chiefs convened it was
presented with two starkly opposing
“road maps.” One was prepared by
the interim government and its legal
advisors and proposed a quasi-con-
stitutional approach: that the Great
Council of Chiefs accept the court
ruling; that it legitimize Ratu Iloilo’s
appointment as president; that it
accept that the president has “re s e rv e d
powers” to dissolve parliament and
call fresh elections; and that the
interim government continue to gov-
ern in a caretaker capacity until elec-
tions are held. The second was pre-
pared by a group of indigenous Fijian
lawyers led by the General Manager
of the Native Land Trust Board. This
rejected the constitutional approach
entirely and instead called on the
Great Council of Chiefs “to resume
its sovereignty granted to them by the
Deed of Cession,” which could be
used to empower the interim govern-
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ment. The interim government should
continue to rule by decree and a “new
legal order” should be created thro u g h
the adoption of a new constitution.
Moreover all those charged with
treason (such as George Speight)
should be granted immediate and
unconditional amnesty (Sunday
Times, 11 Mar 2001, 2). 
As the Great Council of Chiefs
deliberated on these momentous
issues, the deposed People’s Coalition
government struggled (and failed) to
reach a consensus on its preferred
course of action. Former Deputy
Prime Minister Tupeni Baba led a
faction that supported the reconven-
ing of parliament and the formation
of a government of national unity, to
govern for two or three years during
which time issues such as land and
the constitution would be addressed.
Former Prime Minister Mahendra
Chaudhry led another faction strongly
opposed to the creation of a govern-
ment of national unity. Although ini-
tially calling for the reinstatement of
his government, Chaudhry subse-
quently recommended to the acting
p resident that parliament be dissolved,
fresh elections held, and in the mean-
time a caretaker government be
appointed comprising members of 
the dissolved parliament. 
Chaudhry’s advice gave the acting
president the opportunity to imple-
ment the resolutions agreed to by the
Great Council of Chiefs, which essen-
tially followed the quasi-constitu-
tional path advocated by the interim
government and supported by the
military. On 14 March the acting
president dismissed Chaudhry as
prime minister on the grounds that he
no longer commanded the support of
the House (since he had re c o m m e n d e d
the dissolution of parliament). The
acting president then swore in former
Labour parliamentarian Ratu Tevita
Momoedonu as prime minister (to
regularize the appointments of the
president and vice president as well 
as to recommend the dissolution of
parliament). Ratu Tevita had stood in
as prime minister once before (follow-
ing the takeover of parliament in May
2000). Once his prime ministerial
duties were completed, Ratu Tevita
immediately tendered his resignation
and that of “his government,” paving
the way for the president to appoint a
caretaker government. The following
day, having tendered their own resig-
nations, the interim government was
again sworn in as a caretaker govern-
ment to lead the country into elections
later in the year.
Not surprisingly, this outcome sat-
isfied some but shocked others. It was
described by a military spokesman as
the “least worst option” to return the
country to parliamentary rule within
the shortest time. The business com-
munity described the move as “deci-
sive but conciliatory.” On the other
hand, the Labour Party, the National
Federation Party, and the trade union
movement condemned the outcome as
“unconstitutional and unlawful.” A
civil society group, the Citizens Con-
stitutional Forum, filed a motion in
the High Court seeking to annul the
president’s decision to dissolve parlia-
ment. Meanwhile the international
community welcomed the decision to
go to the polls, although political and
economic sanctions on Fiji remained
in place pending the outcome of the
elections. 
As the country moved into election
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mode, the political landscape was
transformed. Political parties frag-
mented and new alignments were
forged. Within the Labour Party, the
rupture over the Court of Appeal
ruling proved irreparable, and a
breakaway group led by Tupeni Baba
formed their own party, named the
New Labour Unity Party (n l up). This
joined with so-called moderate politi-
cal parties in a loose political alliance.
The major Fijian parties (sv t, Fijian
Association Party, Nationalist Party,
Party of National Unity, and Veito-
kani Ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito) also
splintered along provincial, policy,
and personal lines. Two new parties
emerged that would command the
majority of Fijian support. One was
the Conservative Alliance /Matanitu
Vanua (c a m v), based in the north of
the country, which attracted hard-core
supporters of the 2000 coup perpetra-
tors and included in its election lineup
the coup “leader” George Speight
(still held in custody). The other party
was created by caretaker Prime Minis-
ter Laisenia Qarase and included in
its lineup most of the members of the
interim government. Named the Soqo-
soqo ni Duavata ni Lewenivanua
(s d l) or United Fiji Party, it was
launched with much fanfare on 9
May 2001.
The s d l party soon alienated most
other Fijian parties. While condemned
by some for undermining Fijian politi-
cal unity, the main grievance against it
seemed to be the party’s use of politi -
cal office for its own advantage—
mobilizing state resources to secure
support within the Fijian electorate.
Among the initiatives taken in the
lead-up to the election was approval
for a f$52.8 million compensation
payment to landowners at the Mona-
savu dam, Viti Levu’s main source of
hydropower. The caretaker govern-
ment also agreed to pay landowners
at Nadi Airport f$1.2 million in com-
pensation after protests threatened the
operations of the airport. (Both pay-
ments were subsequently put on hold
after court action was taken by oppos-
i n g landowners and by the Native
Land Trust Board.) But it was mainly
the caretaker govern m e n t ’s use of agri-
c u l t u r a l assistance funds that drew the
ire of its political opponents. Promi-
nent sv t politician, Jim Ah Koy—who
would lose his Kadavu seat to the s d l
party—lashed out at the Qarase gov-
ernment: “What has this government
done in its one year? All they have
done is spend the money that the sv t
government put in place. Look at the
number of knives, forks and outboard
engines they have given out as bait for
this election!” (Post, 7 Aug 2001, 1)
The members of the caretaker gov-
ernment were branded as hypocrites
and opportunists—for capitalizing on
the fruits of office while those who
helped put them there (George Speight
and his group) languished on the
prison island of Nukulau. Although a
number of Fijian politicians (and the
c a m v p a rty) called for an amnesty for
the rebel group, neither the caretaker
government nor the military seemed
inclined to “interfere” in the court
proceedings, which limped along from
one adjournment to another. The case
was finally moved to the High Court
in July after the conclusion of com-
mittal proceedings in the Magistrate
Court to determine evidence to sup-
port treason charges. Barring any fur-
ther delays (such as George Speight’s
periodic firing of counsel), the case
was set to begin in February 2002.
The lack of progress in the Speight
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group prosecution, together with the
failure to identify others involved in
the takeover of parliament, over-
shadowed efforts (such as community
events organized by the police) to pro-
mote reconciliation and heal the
wounds of 2000. On the anniversary
of the 19 May takeover, the Fiji Times
condemned the failure to bring those
responsible to justice. “The identities
of those faceless cowards who insti-
gated the hostage taking and sup-
ported Speight throughout are still 
a mystery.” Revelations by a senior
army officer on the eve of his resig-
nation from the Fiji military forces
pointed to the possibility that such
individuals were protected because 
of their powerful and prominent posi-
tions. He alleged that seven plotters
w e re still at large, including pro m i n e n t
business people and a senior military
f i g u re. These allegations, which stirre d
much controversy and speculation,
were given some credence when Police
Commissioner Isikia Savua and high
chief (and Fiji’s High Commissioner
to Malaysia) Adi Samanunu Talakuli
were cleared of any wrongdoing,
despite their well-publicized support
for the hostage-takers in parliament.
Meanwhile the caretaker government
passed a decree granting immunity to
soldiers involved in the revenge kill-
ings that followed the mutiny of
November 2000. This decree was
labeled a “travesty of justice” by the
Fiji Times, on the grounds that it
allowed murder to go unpunished. 
On 11 July the High Court
removed the final legal hurdle to the
August elections when it dismissed a
motion brought by the Citizens Con-
stitutional Forum seeking to annul the
president’s dissolution of parliament.
In his ruling, Justice Michael Scott
a rgued that while the president did act
in a manner inconsistent with the con-
s t i t u t i o n when he failed to summon
parliament (after the Court of Appeal
ruling), such action was justified on
the grounds of necessity. To reconvene
parliament and return the Chaudhry
government to office would have
c reated “a wholly unacceptable risk to
the peace and welfare of the nation”
as well as a “legal and administrative
nightmare” (Times, 12 July 2001, 12,
14).
Threats of unrest should the
Labour Party win the elections and
reports of divisions in the military
c i rculated in the weeks before the poll.
But despite the tense atmosphere, pub-
lic opinion surveys indicated that vot-
ers were primarily concerned about
economic issues. This underscored the
precarious state of the economy in the
wake of the political crisis of 2000.
A number of garment factories closed
their operations in early 2001, leaving
more than a thousand workers unem-
ployed. Uncertainty of land tenure
was causing a drastic drop in cane
production, while the expiry and non-
renewal of land leases left many farm-
ers homeless and destitute. Tourism
arrivals had also declined signifi-
cantly, leading to the loss of some two
thousand jobs in the industry (Sun, 23
Mar 2001, 5). While political parties
promised to address these concerns,
there were indications that voters
remained skeptical of what a new
government would deliver. According
to one evicted cane farmer: “It seems
these politicians get into parliament to
serve themselves and forget the diffi-
culties the poor people face everyday”
(Times, 9 Aug 2001, 3).
Under the scrutiny of Common-
wealth and United Nations observers,
444 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002
the election took place without inci-
dent in late August. Despite predic-
tions of a divided and fragmented
Fijian vote, the result was an almost
sweeping victory for Qarase’s s d l
party (in Fijian constituencies). The
only other serious contender was the
c a m v party. No other Fijian party
won a seat. Meanwhile, the Labour
Party swept to victory in all the Indo-
Fijian constituencies. The final tally
gave s d l 31 seats, c a m v 6 (including
George Speight), Labour 27, New
Labour Unity Party 2, the United
General Party 1, the National Federa-
tion Party (n f p) 1, and independents
(subsequently aligned to the s d l) 2
seats. 
Analyses of the vote revealed that
Labour increased its share of Indo-
Fijian voters compared to the
National Federation Party, and this
was attributed to a combination of its
record in office and Chaudhry’s “bold
leadership.” Meanwhile s d l’s success
was due in no small measure to its
largesse during the election (especially
its distribution of agricultural assis-
tance funds—a “scam” that would
come back to haunt the s d l in the
new year), as well as to the endorse-
ment of the Methodist Church estab-
lishment. s d l policies, which included
legislating a twenty-year blueprint 
of affirmative action programs for
Fijians, revising the 1997 constitution
to entrench Fijian leadership, and
reverting to the Native Land Trust
Act, also appealed to and appeased
(nationalist) Fijian sensitivities and
aspirations stirred up by the events 
of 2000. In this way it was able to
neutralize much of its competition.
The conclusion of the vote count
was followed by five days of tense
negotiations and brinkmanship. With
the single largest party in parliament,
Qarase appeared the most likely can-
didate for prime minister. But to form
a majority government in the seventy-
one-seat parliament, he needed to
create a coalition with several of the
smaller parties. Moreover, under the
constitution, all parties with at least
10 percent of the seats (seven seats or
more) were entitled to places in cabi-
net in proportion to their seats in
parliament. This posed a dilemma 
for Qarase, who had made it clear 
he would not work with Chaudhry in
government. There was also the possi-
bility that if Qarase joined forces with
minor parties, he would need to give
them places in cabinet that would
dilute s dl ’s majority. Labour could
therefore end up with more places in
cabinet than s d l—an unacceptable
prospect. On 10 September, and still
without any resolution to his political
conundrum, Qarase was sworn in as
prime minister. He immediately issued
an invitation to Chaudhry to be part
of his government, which Chaudhry
duly accepted. But Qarase did not
follow up, and Chaudhry was not
consulted further on the makeup of
cabinet.
Initially s d l seemed to favor an
alliance with the so-called moderate
parties (n l u p, United General Party,
and National Federation Party) rather
than the c a m v party. The latter had
insisted, as a condition of any part-
nership, that the detainees on Nuku-
lau (including George Speight) be
released and granted immunity. But
talks with the “moderates” proved
inconclusive and a breakthrough 
with the c a m v party came after 
they agreed to drop their demand for
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immunity for the rebels (reportedly
after George Speight and his fellow
detainees gave the p a rty the go-ahead).
On the night of 11 S e p t e m b e r, the s d l
and c a m v parties signed a memoran-
dum of agreement that specifically
excluded any reference to immunity.
A memorandum was also signed with
one of the n l u p members of parlia-
ment (although this was later
denounced by his party). The next
day, as word of the horrific terrorist
attacks on the United States reached
Fiji, the new cabinet was sworn in. It
comprised twenty ministers and eight
assistant ministers. Qarase rewarded
his minority allies (c a m v, n l u p, and
independents) with a total of five cab-
inet posts. 
The exclusion of the Labour Party
was immediately branded as uncon-
stitutional by observers both locally
and a b road. But the s d l re m a i n e d
defiant. According to a party spokes-
man, to bring Labour in would be
“an unworkable coalition” because of
fundamental differences between the
p a rties (P o s t , 1 8 Sept 2 0 0 1, 3). Qarase
meanwhile claimed that Chaudhry had
put certain conditions on his partici-
pation in government that were unac-
ceptable. But Chaudhry denied this,
claiming that it was Qarase who had
set down conditions for Labour’s
inclusion—namely that it agree to
support s d l’s policies on the affirma-
tive action blueprint, among other
things. At the end of September the
Labour Party filed legal objections
against its exclusion from cabinet in
the High Court (a move welcomed by
Qarase as a way to resolve constitu-
tional issues). The presiding judge
moved to “fast-track” the case
because “it raised issues of law that
should be referred immediately to the
Court of Appeal” (Times, 29 Sept
2001, 1). The case was set down for
hearing in February 2002.
Yet another legal wrangle erupted
as a direct consequence of this court
action. It concerned the appointment
of eight senators nominated on the
advice of the leader of the opposition.
When the president offered the posi-
tion of leader of the opposition,
Chaudhry refused it (so as to await
the Court of Appeal ruling). In order
to fill this position, the president even-
t u a l l y appointed the lone n f p mem-
ber. According to the constitution, the
leader of the opposition’s senate nom-
inees should comprise the nominees 
of parties in the House of Representa-
tives that were entitled to participate
in cabinet. Thus the Labour Party
eventually presented the leader of 
the opposition with their list of eight
nominees. However, before handing
this list to the president, opposition
leader Prem Singh took it on himself
to amend the list (dropping four of
Labour’s nominees and including four
of his own). These nominees were
sworn in, but the president’s office
subsequently decided to seek Supreme
Court clarification on whether this
action was “lawful and constitution-
ally sound” (Times, 23 Oct 2001, 1).
In the meantime, Labour senators
boycotted the remaining sessions of
parliament. 
Despite these constitutional dis-
putes, the international community
moved to normalize relations with Fiji
in the wake of the elections. In early
October, Australia announced it was
lifting all aid and other sanctions, and
a visit by Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer followed in December. How-
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ever, a request from Australia that Fiji
participate in the so-called “Pacific
solution” to the burgeoning refugee
problem was withdrawn after a public
and political outcry in Fiji. Also in
December, the Commonwealth Minis-
terial Action Group lifted Fiji’s suspen-
sion from the Commonwealth Coun-
cils, paving the way for Fiji to attend
the next Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting. New Zealand
and Britain then announced the
resumption of full relations with Fiji.
Only the European Union continued
its aid sanctions on the country, to be
reviewed once the constitutionality of
the government had been resolved. 
As the year drew to a close, the
nation’s fate was again in the hands
of the Court of Appeal. Although the
election was a major step forw a rd and
its outcome was seen to reflect the
“will of the people,” Fiji’s return to
democratic rule was far from complete
or secure. In its first months in office
the (elected) Qarase administration
confronted a legal challenge that had
the potential to force a change of gov-
ernment. It also confronted a political
challenge (a f$25 million farming
assistance scandal) and a security
challenge (a plot to kidnap and assas-
sinate members of government in
order to force the release of George
Speight and his companions on Nuku-
lau). The repercussions of these were
still unfolding in early 2002, but they
threatened further instability and
unrest. Fiji remained on a political
knife-edge, balanced precariously
between the forces of racial extrem-
ism on the one hand and democracy
on the other.
Nowhere was this more evident
than in the debate in parliament in
December over the Qarase govern-
ment’s proposed legislation to provide
affirmative action programs for
indigenous Fijians. As critics attacked
the legislation for being “racially dis-
criminatory” and unconstitutional, its
defenders (including the prime minis-
ter) described the bill as necessary for
peace and stability, in other words,
national security (Sun, 17 Dec 2001,
1). But such attempts to “buy” stabil-
ity by removing “barriers to Fijian
advancement” had failed in the past
to avert political crises and had
instead fostered massive corruption
and abuse of public funds (the farm-
ing assistance scheme being only the
latest example). The vicious cycle of
political instability, racial policies, and
economic mismanagement thus
looked set to continue. In such a situ-
ation it was perhaps no wonder that
so much seemed to depend (however
unrealistically) on the rulings of the
courts.
sandra ta rt e
R e f e re n c e s
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New Caledonia 
As France continued to delegate
administrative and fiscal responsibili-
ties to the terr i t o ry in compliance with
the 1998 Noumea Accord, the March
2001 municipal elections, challenges
in forming the executive council of the
Congress, and senatorial elections in
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September all revealed growing com-
plexity in local politics as well as dis-
array in the pro-independence coali -
tion. John Connell (1988, 231) once
a rgued that the confrontation between
a pro-independence indigenous front
and an entrenched colonial system
bolstered by resident loyalists gave
New Caledonia more nationalist cohe-
sion than other linguistically diverse
M e l a n e s i an c o u n t r i e s , w h i ch h a v e b e e n
wracked by secession movements, civil
wars, and military coups. The inverse
of his idea may also be coming true,
that is, in an officially postcolonial
era, New Caledonia’s ethnic and lin-
guistic diversity may undermine the
old polarized fronts (even as Fiji’s
harden) in ways that would make 
the martyrs of the 1980s scratch their
heads in wonder. In the context of a
local labor strike, a commentator
d e c l a red, “It’s no longer class stru g g l e ,
but a struggle for places [posts]” (NH,
22–28 Feb 2001; the rhyme works
better in French), and perhaps those
w o rds could apply just as well to local
politics.
One of the ironies of the municipal
elections in the territory is that they
are directly controlled by Paris, which
unilaterally seized that power in 1969
as part of its withdrawal of autonomy
from the territory during a nickel
boom. At this most intimate level of
the democratic process, even 3,000
local residents who come from mem-
ber countries of the European Com-
munity other than France are eligible
to vote in the thirty-three Caledonian
communal elections. Another imposi-
tion from the metropole was a new
electoral law that requires gender par-
ity, that is, each party must present as
many women candidates as men. This
progressive proposal was opposed 
by some Caledonian leaders, such as
loyalist Kanak Senator Simon Loueck-
hote, who argued that the territory
was simply not prepared for such a
sudden change—a stand that set off
street protests by local women (Chap-
pell 2 0 0 1, 5 4 4 – 5 4 5) and led to a com-
p romise that exempted smaller com-
munes of less than 3,500 inhabitants.
Another factor was the March 2000
law against the “accumulation of
m a n d a t e s,” which prohibits politicians
f rom holding more than one major
elected office, for example, mayor of 
a large commune, congressional presi -
dent, or member of French parlia-
ment. For 753 seats on municipal
councils, 3,559 candidates cam-
paigned on 149 party lists; voters had
to opt for an entire list, not individu-
als, and seats were allocated on the
basis of proportional representation
(minimum: 5 percent of votes cast). 
In larger communes, a list that won
an absolute majority gained not only
that, but also a proportion of the
remaining seats; if no list won an
absolute majority, a run-off election
w as h e l d, a n d l o s e rs w ho w o n b e t w e e n
5 and 10 percent of the votes could
form new coalitions to contest the
second round. 
The loyalist Rassemblement pour
la Calédonie dans la République
(r p c r) generally showed more unity,
with the notable exception of Paita,
where Harold Martin won reelection
by defying party chief Jacques Lafleur,
who wanted to replace him as mayor
with his cousin Ronald. The pro-inde-
pendence Front de Libération
N a t i o n a l e K a n a k e t S o c i a l i s t e (f l n k s),
in contrast, proved rather weak as an
electoral framework at the local level,
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as its coalition members ran at times
on one list, at other times on separate
lists, and sometimes on lists combined
with other parties, and local Kanak
factionalism became pronounced. 
The two main coalition partners, the
Union Calédonienne (u c) and Palika
(Parti de Libération Kanak), once
again ran separately, but even the u c
was split, ever since seven of its con-
gressional representatives had broken
away from the leadership of Rock
Wamytan the previous year. On each
of t he outer islands of Lifou and M a re ,
about 5,000 voters had to choose
between eight or nine lists, including
several alliances “against nature” (ie,
loyalists and independence support-
ers). The r p c r predictably dominated
the multiethnic southern province,
where Jean Leques was reelected
mayor of Noumea (he was also presi-
dent of the congressional executive
but had to give that up; see below),
a n d P i e rre F ro g i e r was re e l e c t e d m a y o r
of nearby Mont-Dore (which he
immediately gave up to remain a
deputy in the French National Assem-
bly). In an upset, Jean-Pierre Aifa, the
longtime “caliph” (he is of North Afri-
can descent) of Bourail and a dissident
loyalist, lost to Guy Moulin of the
r p c r, but Bernard Marant, another
dissident loyalist, defeated his r p c r
rival in Dumbea. One woman, Ghis-
laine Creugnet, was elected r p c r
mayor of the smallest commune,
Farino. In the northern province, Paul
Neaoutyine won reelection as Palika
mayor of Poindimie and kept his
presidency of the province because
Poindimie is so small, while dissident
loyalist Robert Frouin retained his
multiparty mayorship in Koumac, the
north’s fishing port. In very close run-
off elections in the islands province,
Palika took Ouvea, the u c took
Lifou, and an anti-f l n k s coalition
won on Mare—where high chief
Nidoish Naisseline, once a radical
nationalist, allied with the r p c r and
its congressional majority partner, the
Fédération des Comités de Coordina-
tion Indépendantistes (f c c i , former
f l n k s leaders) (N C and N H, Mar
2001, various). 
Altogether, two-thirds of the may-
ors elected were Kanak (only two of
which were r p c r) and pro-indepen-
dence lists won in almost twice as
many communes (19) as the r p cr-
f c c i coalition (10): 9 Palika, 6 u c,
3 u p m (Union Progressiste Mélanési-
enne), and 1 f l n k s, compared to 8
r p c r and 2 f c c i, while the new
municipal council majorities in four
other communes did not fit readily
into either camp. But the loyalist
communes of the south are much
more populous, amounting to over 60
percent of the total inhabitants (NC,
20 Mar 2001). The r p c r kept a firm
grip on the capital, Noumea, where
one-third of the registered electorate
lives, winning 39 council seats com-
p a red to 1 0 for a mixed o p p o s i t i on l e d
by dissident loyalists of the Alliance
list; and Leques won the mayorship
for a fourth six-year term. Ironically,
the Kanak vote in N o u m ea w a s a l m o s t
invisible, despite a large resident pop-
ulation (sometimes called the largest
Kanak “tribe”), because Kanak voters
tend to register in their home villages
and commute to cast their ballots, in
o rder to ensure the allocation of devel-
opment funds there and to support
local Kanak politicians. That strategy
makes it very difficult for centrist or
pro-independence lists to succeed in
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the capital and contributes to a polar-
ization among the provinces, with
Kanak dominating the north and
islands. It is one reason why indepen-
dence supporters place so much hope
in mining and fishing projects in the
north, and in tourism in the islands,
to draw business and population away
from Noumea (Sylvain Pabouty, pers
comm, Mar 2001). In France itself,
apart from leftist upsets in Paris and
Lyon, conservatives seized forty for-
merly leftist communes. This can be
attributed to President Jacques
Chirac’s appeal to the insecurity felt
in smaller towns in the face of Social-
ist Premier Lionel Jospin’s controver-
sial concessions to Corsican autono-
mists and general support for regional
decentralization under the command
of large cities. Chirac now feels confi-
dent of reelection as French President
in 2002 (N C, 20 Mar 2001; Monde,
Mar 2001; Libération, 22 Mar 2001;
Figaro, 12 Mar 2001). 
In the September election for
senator (to the French parliament),
Loueckhote of the r p c r won a sec-
ond nine-year term with 250 votes,
defeating Marie-Claude Tjibaou (wife
of deceased u c leader Jean-Marie),
who had 174 votes, and Aifa, the ex-
mayor of Bourail, who had 51. The
f l n k s hesitated even to participate,
then opted to try to block the r p c r
candidate but failed. The 484 “great
electors” who choose the senator are
selected by the municipal councils
(weighted in favor of the more popu-
lous) and provincial assemblies (N C,
31 Aug, 26 Sept 2001; p i r , 25 Sept
2001). Loueckhote had been involved
in a violent altercation with an older
f l n k s s u p p o rter from his home island
of Ouvea in March. The two were
waiting at Magenta airport for a flight
to Ouvea to participate in the election
of a mayor by the new municipal
council, of which both were members,
when the older man apparently began
berating the senator. Before airport
gendarmes could separate them, the
senator punched and kicked the older
man, who died of a heart attack
shortly afterwards, though coroners
could not establish a “direct and cer-
tain” link between the fight and his
death. A subsequent lawsuit clearly
did not affect Loueckhote’s political
c a re e r. Besides being senator, he is also
president of the Territorial Congress,
islands provincial assembly delegate,
and municipal councilor on Ouvea
(N C, 26 Mar, 28 Mar, 12 Apr 2001).
Leques had to resign from his pres-
idency of the congressional executive
(an eleven-person cabinet elected by
the Congress and called “the govern-
ment”), a position he had held since
May 1999, in order to retain his may-
orship of Noumea. The municipal
election results thus precipitated a new
election of the territorial government
in April, which in turn exacerbated
the disunity in the f l n k s. Frogier of
the r p c r re p l a c e d L e q u e s as p re s i d e n t ,
but Leopold Jorédié of the f c c i, who
had been convicted of corruption
charges the year before and given a
suspended sentence, was replaced as
vice president by Déwé Gorodey of
Palika. A pro-independence activist of
long standing as well as a teacher and
writer, she became the first woman to
hold such a high office in New Cale-
donia. This victory for gender “par-
ity” (the r p c r had one woman in the
cabinet) was also celebrated by the
f l n k s, because it had already been
complaining of a lack of “collegiality”
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(ie, power-sharing) between it and the
r p c r- f c c i, which together hold a
congressional majority of 28 to 26
seats. The r p c r retained six cabinet
p o rtfolios, the f c c i one (Jorédié), and
the f l n k s four (divided a m o ng P a l i k a ,
Wamytan’s u c, the dissident u c
group, and the Wallisian Rassemble-
ment Démocratique Océanien, or
r d o). (N C, 6 Apr 2001; p ir , 8 Apr
2001) Unfortunately for the f l n k s,
the French State Council ruled in
October that one of the cabinet seats
held by the pro-independence front
had been awarded improperly and
gave the eleventh seat to Raphael
Mapou of the f c c i instead of Tino
Manuohalalo of the r d o. The two
had received almost the same number
of votes, so Congress had given the
f l n k s that seat, on the basis of
Article L338 of the Electoral Code,
because Manuohalalo was younger
than Mapou, but the decision was
reversed because Mapou had received
slightly more votes (proportional rules
normally average the votes). As a
result, the f l n k s representation on
the cabinet was reduced to only three
out of eleven, and Wamytan, who had
been threatening to boycott the gov-
ernment for two years over the colle-
giality issue, resigned from the cabi-
net, arguing that the f l n k s had won
40 percent of the votes in the 1999
provincial elections and deserved a
bigger voice in decision making (N C,
3 Oct, 17 Oct 2001; p i r, 26 Sept
2001). “It is out of the question,”
Wamytan said, “that we should go on
sitting in a government that has been
made completely out of balance as a
result of Court decisions which, in my
view, are bordering on political deci-
sions” (p ir , 23 Oct 2001). 
Others argued that a more united
f l n k s would easily have secured the
disputed seat. Vice President Gorodey
of Palika did not join Wamytan’s cab-
inet boycott, nor did Gerard Cortot of
the dissident u c group. The break-
away of seven congressional u c repre-
sentatives from Wamytan’s leadership
in April 2000 thus continued to haunt
the f l n k s. In April, soon after the
municipal elections, Wamytan called a
meeting of the u c governing commit-
tee at the Club Med in Noumea. He
denounced in strong terms the “per-
manent putsch” by dissidents that
threatened to ruin New Caledonia’s
oldest political party, which had lost
control of seven communes the month
before. Pascal Naouna resigned as u c
vice president in protest, claiming that
his dissident group wanted to preserve
a u c identity separate from the f l n k s
c o a l i t i o n ( Wamytan was h e ad of both).
The embattled president warned
against the embourgeoisement
(becoming middle-class) of party mili-
tants, which had already drawn for-
mer f l n k s members like Jorédié and
Mapou into the collaborationist f c c i:
“Will we know how to resist the pres-
sures of the [French] State and the
multinationals?” (N C, 9 Apr 2001).
Wamytan received a vote of confi-
dence in July when the Melanesian
Spearhead Group held its annual
summit in Noumea. After a diplo-
matic wrangle over whether it was
France, New Caledonia, or the f l n k s
that was hosting the meeting, the
regional group showed its opinion by
electing Wamytan its president for the
next two years (p i r, 17 July 2001;
N C, 30 July 2001). But in November,
the u c’s thirty-second annual congre s s
elected Naouna president by a vote of
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174 to 74 against Wamytan; Naouna
had lost to Wamytan by only four
votes the previous year (N C, 5 Nov
2001; p i r, 9 Nov 2001). And in
December, the annual f l n k s congress
refused even to choose between
Wamytan or Palika’s Neaoutyine as its
p re s i d e n t . f l n k s spokesperson Victor
Tu t u g o ro, of the u p m, explained,
“The Congress confided the direction
of the management of the party to the
Political Bureau for a period of one
year” (N C, 24 Dec 2001).
It is worth noting that Palika nor-
mally operates exactly that way, with-
out a president, and its star is rising
as the u c struggles. The f l n k s is still
respected as a “tool of struggle” by
pro-independence militants but as less
than useful as an electoral mecha-
nism. At its November congress
Palika asserted that f l n k s coalition
members (u c, Palika, u p m , r d o) will
campaign as autonomous parties in
elections, and that Palika will con-
tinue to try to convert people to its
goal of “revolutionary socialist Kanak
independence” based on Kanak values
and the principles of “justice, equity,
equality and solidarity”(N C, 8 Nov
2001). Yet people have prematurely
predicted the demise of the u c for
decades; by January 2002, Naouna of
the u c became head of an f l n k s del-
egation to Paris (N C, 19 Jan 2002).
The difference between the u c and
Palika is partly one of generations,
since the latter was formed by student
radicals in the 1970s and still tends to
attract younger, university-educated
Kanak such as Charles Washetine and
Sylvain Pabouty. The f l n k s is also
divided by internal Kanak rivalries
based on family, chieftaincy, language
group, or region, in addition to the
emerging class divisions that Wamy-
tan and others warn about. In the
March municipal elections on Mare,
for example, discord within the u c,
local rivalries within and between
tribes, and “customary” vs “adminis-
trative” Kanak factionalism gave the
mayorship to a motley anti-f l n k s
coalition ( Jean-Paul Caillard, pers
comm, Apr 2001; N H, 22–28 Mar
2001). 
Meanwhile, the r p c r coalition
partner in Congress, the f c c i, tends
to be regarded either as “realistic”
pro-independence people who are try-
ing to work constructively with loyal-
ists, or as stooges of the r p c r who
a re fleeing to Lafleur’s patronage fro m
legal or financial problems or political
eclipse. In July, the f c c i congress
elected François Burck, mayor of
Moindou, as its party president by 
38 votes to 28 for incumbent Mapou,
a former Palika militant. Burck, an
old companion of Jean-Marie Tjibaou
and moderate head of the u c for
seven years until 1 9 9 8 , vowed to work
for local citizenship and a common
destiny for all Caledonians, as the
Noumea Accord prescribed (N C, 22
July 2001). The sticky ideas of local
citizenship and preferential employ-
ment for long-term residents have yet
to be seriously addressed, and the
Noumea Accord raises other complex
cultural issues. As Naisseline pointed
out in May, an organic law of 1999
proposed that territorial residents had
to choose within five years whether to
live under French civil law or indige-
nous custom; but after two years, no
real preparation has been made to
educate people about making such 
a decision (p i r, 31 May 2001). A
founding leader of Palika, Naisseline
452 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002
broke away in 1981 over the issue of
whether Kanak culture or “scientific
socialism” should guide the party.
Naisseline uses his chiefly power base
on Mare to retain political office and
defend custom. He attacks former
Kanak militants who seek “French
respectability” as untraditional pro f e s-
sionals, yet says France “is no longer
an enemy to combat, but a partner”
(N C, 2 Nov 2001)—evidently against
f l n k s domination at this stage of his
career. After the nineteenth annual
congress of his party, Libération
Kanak Socialiste (l k s), in November,
he again criticized the new Kanak
political class for excluding from
power “the customary, religious
masses and young people,” and
denounced the French State, the
r p c r, and the f l n k s for imposing a
European political system that did not
fit: “We want to install an Oceanian
democracy.” Criticized by the f l n k s
for repeatedly forming expedient
coalitions with the r p c r, f c c i, and
other dubious liberationists, he says
“politics is a game of alliance” (N C,
8 Nov 2001). Naisseline holds provin-
cial and municipal office and occupies
the sole l k s seat in Congress. 
The r p c r may dominate territorial
politics (just as some critics of the
Noumea Accord’s plan to delegate
increasing authority from Paris to
Noumea once predicted), but it too
faces dissident opposition in the loyal-
ist camp. At the head of the r p c r
since its founding in 1977 is million-
aire businessman Lafleur, who is a
deputy to the French parliament and
member of the Territorial Congress.
His social receptions have been
likened to the court of Louis XIV,
whom he in fact occasionally quotes;
if courtiers do not receive a handshake
from him, it is whispered that their
political careers are ruined. Less
respectful critics refer to Lafleur’s
powerful political and economic
patronage system as a “mafia.” In the
past four years his regal attitude has
cost him six convictions for public
slander and other civil injuries to
people ranging from a former French
administrator to a local newspaper
editor. Frogier and Loueckhote, his
fellow parliamentarians in Paris,
wrote a joint letter in October to
President Chirac protesting against
the many damages Lafleur has had to
pay, calling it “colonial justice” (N C,
18 Oct 2001; p i r, 12 Feb 2001).
Meanwhile, dissident loyalists of the
Alliance party led by Didier Leroux
and Sonia Lagarde continue to con-
demn Lafleur’s monopolism, and Mar-
tin remains “r p c r” mayor of Paita in
defiance of his official exclusion from
the r p c r. At the congress of the r p c r
in June, supporters of Martin spoke
in favor of more democracy within
the party and the need to prepare for
a successor to Lafleur, who himself
has talked of retirement. But Lafleur
still opposed Martin’s reinstatement,
accusing him of wanting power only
for himself and stressing the need for
unity and discipline (N C, 11 June
2001). Lafleur was reelected president
of the party by a show of hands, and
Loueckhote asserted, “Which political
party is now able to unite so many
people? Only Jacques Lafleur’s party.
It just needs to utter his name” (p i r,
27 June 2001). 
On the economic front, New
Caledonia’s normal trade deficit was
reduced by about one-third in 2000,
thanks to that year’s rise in world
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prices for nickel, the territory’s largest
export. France still provided 82 per-
cent of the territory’s imports (p i r, 19
Mar 2 0 0 1). Local commercial farm i n g
and livestock raising increased another
4 percent, for a total of 60 percent
since 1989, and a new tuna fishing
fleet based at the northern port of
Koumac received its first two vessels
in March (N C, 26 Mar 2001; p i r, 23
Apr 2001). In December, the Congress
approved a law that delegated control
of the territory’s coastal zone from
France to New Caledonia and its
p rovinces, though the l k s, u c, and
Alliance voted against it, while the
f l n k s abstained, because of concerns
expressed by the new Customary
Senate over the impact of applying
French-derived littoral law on Kanak
customary rights (N C, 22 Dec 2001).
T he l o c al t o u r i sm i n d u s t ry w as a l re a d y
in crisis as some airlines had recently
cancelled their routes to New Caledo-
nia, and the September 11th attacks
on New York and Washington d c led
several tour agencies to drop the terri-
tory from their destinations (p i r, 5
Oct 2001). Various local groups
expressed opposition to those attacks,
including the f l n k s, for whom Tutu-
goro said, “Blind terrorism is to be
condemned since it mainly strikes the
innocent.” He reminded the super-
powers, however, of “other peoples
around the world, who have or still
endure violence on a daily basis and
in the name of a certain established
order, whether in central Europe, in
the Middle East, in central Asia or on
the African continent” (p i r, 19 Sept
2001).
The Frogier government expressed
official optimism about a number of
developments, such as the July deci-
sion by Paris, after long negotiations,
to approve the territory’s purchase,
tax-free, of two 278-passenger Airbus
A330 planes for Air Calédonie Inter-
national, whose expanded tourism
service to Japan will replace Air
France on the Tokyo–Noumea run
(N C, 28 July 2001; p i r, 15 Aug, 
31 Oct 2001). Moves to localize the
police force with better training and
more recruitment from the interior
went forward, as French Secretary of
State for Overseas Territories Chris-
tian Paul called New Caledonia the
envy of the Pacific because of its new
political stability and autonomy (N C,
27 Nov 2001). The Congress also
revamped its recent General Tax on
Services (now called a Tax of Solidar-
ity on Services) of 4 percent so that its
revenues could be applied to the ailing
social services fund; this will enable
the implementation of a new Unified
Social Coverage plan. The latter was
particularly supported by Palika,
which voted with the loyalist majority
against the u c and f l n k s on the tax
reform (N C, 24 Nov 2001). The Con-
gressional Finance Commission pre-
dicted an economic boom, primarily
because of new investment in nickel
mining and processing plants, but that
industry was a cause of concern for
the opposition parties (N C, 21 Dec
2001). In January, the government
voted to give the new nickel plant 
at Goro, a joint venture between the
State and Inco of Canada in the S o u t h ,
twenty years of full or partial tax
exemption, compared to only thirteen
for the new plant at Koniambo in the
Kanak-ruled North, a joint venture
between the province and Falcon-
bridge of Canada. Pro-independence
p a rties cried foul, as did Mapou of the
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f c c i, and environmentalists critic i z e d
p o t e n t i a l c o a s t al pollution by the G o ro
plant (N C, 3 1 Jan, 1 Feb, 1 6 F e b
2001). Furthermore, nickel prices
dropped almost 50 percent in 2001,
causing the northern province’s min-
ing firm to reduce working hours for
600 of its employees (p i r, 16 Nov
2001). Others warned that a boom 
in nickel production would increase
immigration and repeat the political
crisis of the early 1970s, when loyal-
ists gained a demographic majority
for the first time (Jean-Paul Caillard,
pers comm, Apr 2001). Despite these
obstacles, the government is making
every effort to expand production,
which so far provides only 6 percent
of the world demand (p i r, 28 June
2001). 
In spite of embourgeoisement
among politicians, militancy survived
on other fronts. A “social pact” nego-
tiated in 2000 was designed to pre-
vent wildcat labor strikes (N C, 24
Mar 2001), but the pro-independence
Union Syndicaliste des Travailleurs
Kanak et Exploités (u s t k e) waged its
usual militant battles against various
employers periodically throughout the
year. In February, it closed down the
French overseas radio and television
station (r f o) in Noumea for a week,
its ninth such action against the r f o
in five years, and in April it began
four months of rotating strikes against
Jean-Lefebvre Pacifique over the firing
of unionists (N C, 21 Feb, 28 July
2001). After celebrating its twentieth
anniversary in December, when it
re a ff i rmed its goal of building a multi-
racial, independent Kanaky (N C, 7
Dec 2001), the u s t k e closed out the
year by occupying the Club Med after
the latter closed its doors following
the September 11th crisis in t o u r i s m
(N C, 1 2 Jan 2 0 0 2). The eighth Con-
ference of Pacific Women met in Nou-
m e a in S e p t e m b er (p i r, 1 2 Sept 2 0 0 1) ,
and in October, 300 New Caledonian
women marched through the city
demanding the creation of women’s
centers in each commune and a terri-
torial ministry of women’s affairs.
Women workers outnumber men in
New Caledonia and hold more than
60 percent of higher educational
degrees but receive less pay than men
for the same jobs (p i r, 22 Oct 2001).
The Melanesian Spearhead held its
Festival of Melanesian Arts on Lifou
in the islands province in December
(p i r, 12 Nov 2001), but New Cale-
donia’s bid to host the 2007 South
Pacific Games was defeated by a
council vote of 25 to 16 in favor of
Sämoa, which the territory’s promoter
Eric Gay typically attributed to an
“Anglo-Saxon” conspiracy (p i r, 11
Dec 2001). Land reform to redress
Kanak grievances about colonial
expropriation continued (p i r, 12 Oct
2001), and the Jean-Marie Tjibaou
Cultural Center welcomed the return
of eighteen Kanak artifacts from the
Musée de l’Homme in Paris for a
three-year exhibition (p i r, 14 Aug
2001).
While most political news focused
on Caledonian loyalists and Kanak
nationalists, relations with Wallis and
Futuna, which has sent over half its
population to New Caledonia in the
past half century, were also an impor-
tant issue. The Noumea Accord pro-
posed the negotiation of a special
agreement between the two French
territories, because local Caledonian
citizenship and hiring preference were
clearly perceived as threats to contin-
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ued access to New Caledonia’s min-
eral-rich economy by migrant workers
from its resource-poor Polynesian
neighbor. Talks continued during the
year, and a draft text was signed in
June. It proposed the full integration
of Wallisians long resident in New
Caledonia, but also called for more
F rench investment in developing Wa l l i s
and Futuna “to better fix the p o p u l a-
tions and limit the flow to New Cale-
donia” (N C, 2 June 2001). The r d o,
which belongs to the f l n k s coalition,
called for more aid to Wallisian com-
munities in New Caledonia. Wa l l i s i a n s
often live in poor conditions and are
still treated like immigrants, r d o
leader Aloisio Sako said; even though
“we have contributed to the wealth 
of this country, we have worked hard.
. . .Yet today most of the aid measure s
and re-balancing benefits Kanak not
us” (N C, 12 Feb 2001). Bitter Kanak
memories of hired Wallisian militias
in the service of loyalists during the
violent 1980s still affect relations
between the two groups. In early
December, an armed conflict erupted
in the St. Louis community in Mont-
Dore near Noumea. After school,
students from both groups fought, and
six houses near the Catholic church
were set on fire. In 1985, 500 Wallis-
ians had received a gift of twenty-
three hectares of land and had fol-
lowed appropriate customary pro t o c o l
to gain acceptance in the Kanak tribe
of St. Louis (of which Wamytan is 
a chief). But when the Wallisians
appeared to receive more benefits
from the government (such as water,
electricity, and housing), while the
Kanak had to barricade the road to
demand streetlights, and later Wallis-
ian immigrants acted without respect
for the Kanak, tensions exploded.
Recent peace talks produced a truce
and a proposal to relocate the Wallis-
ians to a new site, but the underlying
problem was delinquency among
unemployed young Kanak and Wallis-
ians, due to the unequal distribution
of economic growth in the territory
(N C, 10–18 Dec 2001; p i r , 12 Dec
2001; Kanaky, 12–18 Dec 2001).
Wallisians now comprise almost 10
percent of the territorial population,
and in the municipal elections in
March, their performance groups
danced for whichever part y, loyalist or
nationalist, would support their claim
to a place in the territory’s proposed
“common destiny.”
david chappell
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Pa p ua New Guinea
Years of unabated and systemic cor-
ruption within Papua New Guinea’s
government machinery and preoccu-
pation with political self-aggrandize-
ment over economic rationalities
finally took visible toll on the coun-
try’s economy in 2001. Anyone famil-
iar with the country’s past glory days
strolling through the streets of Port
Moresby would no doubt confront
the stark realities of poverty in the
eyes and physical appearance of most
city dwellers. Indeed, Prime Minister
Sir Mekere Morauta concedes that the
1990s was a decade of lost develop-
ment for Papua New Guinea, evi-
denced by the country’s disappointing
human development indicators (Post-
Courier, 18 Oct 2001).
With a population of over 5 mil-
lion people (up by 36 percent since
the last census in 1990) and a growth
rate of 3.1 percent compared to 2.7
percent in the last decade, the Asian
Development Bank (a d b) declared
that over a third of the population
now live in absolute poverty (a d b
2001). The country’s average income
fell by almost 75 percent from a high
of us$1,300 in 1994 to us$744 in
the millennium as the economy
entered a nontransitory period of
recession (National, 24 Sept 2001).
Public debt rose to k8 billion in 2 0 0 1,
compared to k3 billion in 1999 when
Morauta took office. Morauta’s long
and winding “road to recovery” and
promised “date with destiny” (made
in November 1999 during the parlia-
mentary presentation of the 2000
budget) inevitably made public-sector
reforms the dominant issues. Most
significant was the sale of state-owned
enterprises in 2001.
For the preceding two years, the
Morauta government and the Privati-
zation Commission have had to con-
tend with the results of years of ram-
pant corruption and mismanagement
by political appointees, which by 2 0 0 1
had virtually destroyed the indepen-
dence and decimated the capital of
most of the state-owned enterprises.
Because the release of further World
Bank loans was premised on the priva-
t i z a t i o n of the state bank, the Papua
New Guinea Banking Corporation
(p n g b c), it had to write off bad debts
amounting to k45 million in order to
attract potential buyers and struggled
with nonperforming loans in its port-
folio. The previous year had seen the
state bank incurring a declared oper-
ating loss of k31 million when it
spent k114 for every k100 earned.
Other state-owned enterprises were
all technically insolvent. The Electric-
ity Commission was over k400 mil-
lion in debt, while Air Niugini had
incurred operating losses of k42 mil-
lion in 1998 and k36 million in 1999
(National, 26 July 2001). Post PNG,
which is responsible for mail delivery,
owed creditors some k25 million and
was subsequently placed under liqui-
dation.
In response to trade union opposi-
t i on t o the privatization of PNG B a n k-
ing Corporation and an anti-land
mobilization movement comprising
university students and socialist
nongovernment organizations, Prime
Minister Morauta challenged his crit-
ics to choose between “service” and
“ownership” and provide tangible
a l t e rnatives to p r i v a t i z a t i o n . T h e p r i m e
minister lamented, “We will try and
explain but I can’t go on explaining
until the nation is dead” (National,
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18 July 2001). A two-day protest in
July against privatization and land
reform by students and unsuspecting
squatter settlers, who were mobilized
by socialist nongovernment organi-
zations, resulted in the death of four
University of Papua New Guinea
students when live bullets were fired
on the protesters by police riot squads
flown in from the Highlands region.
The confrontation resulted from a
police attempt to break up a sit-in by
protesters in the Waigani government
area.
Elsewhere, in the superannuation
industry—where political appointees
flexed their muscles on the boards—
the carnage of corruption was also
visibly clear. A commission of inquiry
looked into the mismanagement of
the National Provident Fund (n p f)
that resulted in a 15 percent write-
down of private-sector workers’ funds;
they learned that the former n p f
chairman, Jimmy Maladina, who had
since fled together with his family to
Queensland, Australia, had decimated
the fund of almost k8 million. Jimmy
Maladina was appointed to the n p f
board by the former government of
Bill Skate under intense pressure from
the former finance minister and par-
liamentary leader of Morauta’s Peo-
ple’s Democratic Movement party
(p d m), which was a major coalition
p a rtner in the Skate govern m e n t . S o m e
of the stolen money (k200, 000) was
rumored by the opposition leader, Sir
M i c h a e l S o m a re , to have been solicited
by Morauta to change the Skate gov-
ernment in 1999 (National, 6 Dec
2001). Moreover, between k1 and 
k3 million of the n p f funds was also
alleged to have been paid to twenty-
seven p d m ministers whose names
were identified in an affidavit sworn
in a Brisbane court by an Australian
associate linked to the n p f scam. The
business associate was the managing
director of PNG First Real Estate, one
of the companies used by the ringlead-
ers as a front for parking the missing
n p f funds (National, 6 Dec 2001).
Nor was the Defence Force Retire-
ment Benefits Fund spared the reach
of politicians and their political
cronies. The n p f Commission of
Inquiry unearthed serious loopholes
in the superannuation laws and prac-
tices, prompting Morauta to appoint
a super funds task force to revamp
the industry and avert it from further
dilapidation.
Furthermore, politicians themselves
lived up to their notoriety in terms of
appropriating funds from the public
coffers for personal use. In 2001 the
Ombudsman Commission referred ten
ministers of parliament to the public
prosecutor on charges of misconduct.
Such charges usually involve trial
before a leadership tribunal and often
result in dismissal from public office
for a period of only three years. Eight
of the ministers allegedly misused
funds from the National Gaming Con-
t rol Board (n g c b), which had been 
a major cash cow under the former
administration. Because Morauta’s
p d m party had been a major part of
the coalition in the disgraced Skate
government, eyebrows were raised
when the Morauta government had to
hastily write off a total of k15 million
from the n g c b books. This was made
possible by parliament’s acceptance of
amendments to the National Gaming
Control Board Act. The amendments
were sneaked into parliament by the
leader of government business and
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voted on by an unsuspecting parlia-
ment, as ministers are often not given
sufficient time to read what they are
voting on, or they simply do not have
the time to wade through tedious and
lengthy public policy documents.
Broader public-sector reforms in
the public service and PNG Defence
Force were attempted. A confidential
policy submission to cabinet in March
2001 sought to reduce the size of the
force. However, this was met with
stiff opposition from personnel based
at Murray Barracks, the force’s head-
q u a rt e r s , leading to a d a n g e rous stand-
o ff between the mutinous soldiers and
Morauta. Resentment appeared to
stem from the fact that the reform
measures originated from an external
task force, namely the Commonwealth
Eminent Persons’ Group, put together
by Morauta and the Commonwealth
Secretary-General in London. That
this would have resulted in a much
leaner, better-equipped, better-disci-
plined, and better-trained force did not
matter to the disgruntled soldiers. For
them the important issue was job
security in an increasingly uncertain
economic and political environment.
To resolve the standoff, Morauta gave
in, in deference to a new reform
package to be designed internally, but
given the country’s financial mess, he
insisted that retrenchment was neces-
sary for the PNG Defence Force to
remain viable. By the end of the year
it was clear that the force would have
to downsize by 1,307 men to a ceiling
of 2,000 before March 2002. The
first list of 110 names was approved
by the Defence Council and submitted
to the Department of Personnel Man-
agement. This time the Australian
government made retrenchment funds
available.
The year also saw the passage of a
major piece of legislation, namely the
Organic Law on Political Parties and
Candidates (the Integrity Law). Legis-
lative reforms to the electoral system
have also been proposed to replace
the current first-past-the-post system
with the optional preferential voting
system. The Integrity Law sought to
limit the number of independent can-
didates and uncommitted party mem-
bers who have been known to hop
from party to party, thereby intensify-
ing political instability. The new law
also established a Political Party Board
responsible for registering parties and
administering the rules aimed at
instilling discipline and reducing the
number of parties. By year’s end,
twenty-two parties had registered 
for the looming 2002 election.
The pre f e rential voting system seeks
to broaden a candidate’s representa-
tiveness. The majority of politicians
have won their seats by a margin of
victory of less than 6 percent over 
the runner-up, and this pattern has
increased since the 1977 election. In
fact, from 1977 to 1997 the number
of seats with winning margins of 2
percent or less almost doubled, from
23 to 44 out of a total of 109 seats.
In 1997, 80 out of 109 ministers
(73.4 percent) won their seats by less
than 6 percent (Okole 2001). Thus
the obviously irrational behaviors of
PNG politicians could be viewed as
dysfunctional coping strategies in
response to their high attrition rate 
at the polls.
Yet another major piece of reform
was the restoration of the Public Ser-
vices Commission, in a nostalgic eff o rt
to relive its glory days before 1986
when it monopolized the power to
hire and fire. The reform promises to
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eliminate the power of politicians to
appoint cronies and business associ-
ates to senior positions in the public
service and state-owned enterprises.
The rejuvenated Public Services Com-
mission would help restore appoint-
ments to provincial governments such
as that of the Southern Highlands,
where, as political infighting wore on,
at the end of 2001 no less than four
provincial administrators were being
paid against a position for only one
(Post-Courier, 20 Dec 2001).
The Morauta government also
moved to subject the perks and privi-
leges of heads of state-enterprises to
the review of the Salaries and Condi-
tions Monitoring Committee. This
was done by endorsing a proposal to
have state-owned businesses estab-
lished under the Companies Act be
subject to the monitoring committee.
H i t h e rto, a practice has been for polit-
i c a l appointees to state-owned enter-
prises to draw up their own employ-
ment contracts, seldom for less than
k200,000, and subsequently engineer
their own termination by the minister
responsible, or by another minister
acting on the position while the
incumbent minister purposely takes
an overseas trip. The politically
appointed executive then cries foul
and either goes to court or lobbies for
an early out-of-court settlement. This
tactic when not checkered is used to
attract full-contract entitlement pay-
ment for the usual contract period of
three years, to the detriment of the
concerned state-owned enterprise.
Various parties to the deal, including
the minister responsible, stand to ben-
efit from the distribution of the spoils.
The efforts of the Morauta govern-
ment to reform the PNG economy
eventually paid off, at least for the
time being, in December 2001 when
the World Bank announced the release
of the second tranche of a us$90 mil-
lion loan under the Governance Pro-
motion Adjustment Loan initially
agreed to in June 2000 (World Bank
2001), as well as the approval of a
us$70 million loan from the Asian
Development Bank toward public sec -
tor reform (a d b 2001). The Morauta
government’s public-sector reforms
are being coordinated by the Public
Sector Reform Management Unit,
located within the prime minister’s
department, and the Central Agencies
Coordination Committee. The loan
funds are earmarked mainly for meet-
ing the costs of retrenchments, and
improvements to human resource
management and payroll system.
Nearly all aid donors including
AusAID have contributed to PNG
public-sector re f o rms since 1 9 97, o f t e n
under the generic terms of “good gov-
ernance” and “institutional strength-
ening.”
The re l e a se of t he loan monies c a m e
in the wake of the decision by the
Morauta government to sell 75 per-
cent of PNG Banking Corporation to
a local bank, B a n k S o u th Pacific (b s p) ,
for k175 million (National, 30 Nov
2001). The sale price itself was con-
troversial in that a year earlier the
value of the state bank had been esti-
mated at k400 million. The choice of
Bank South Pacific as the highest bid-
der was also controversial as it was
reported that the Australian and New
Zealand Banking Group (a n z) was
willing to pay k200 million. Arousing
further controversy was the govern-
ment’s eleventh-hour decision to sell
75 percent of the bank, 25 percent
more than its initial share offer. In
addition, conflict of interest in the sale
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was alleged on the part of key off i c i a l s
with vested interest in the parties to
the sale. For example, the managing
director of the Privatization Commis-
sion, Sir Henry ToRobert, is also the
chair of Credit Corporation, which
prior to the sale was a major share-
holder in Bank South Pacific, the
buyer of PNG Banking Corporation;
the BSP chair is the current managing
director of Credit Corporation; and
the current p n g b c executive chair is
the former chair of Credit Corpora-
tion. Ironically, after the sale of PNG
Banking Corporation, Privatization
Commission Executive Chair Ben
Micah had to quit his k400,000 post,
as he himself was declared insolvent
by the National Court for owing the
banking corporation over k481,000,
with annual interest accruing at 11
percent (Post-Courier, 24 Dec 2001).
By December 2001, a number of
agencies from within and without
gave scorecard evaluations of the
Morauta government’s performance.
T h e PNG Institute of National A ff a i r s ,
a private-sector think tank, credited
the Morauta government with making
positive reforms to the political sys-
tem and monetary policy and moving
the resolution of the Bougainville crisis
to within a pen’s stroke, as parliament
had only to vote on an autonomy
package following the signing of the
Bougainville Peace Agreement on 30
August, but they also reported that
the government had failed to remove
obstacles to investment and growth,
which it identified as corruption,
infrastructure problems, crime and
theft, and policy instability.
The International Monetary Fund
commented that the government’s
structural reform and economic stabi-
lization program stayed on course
despite a very volatile business envi-
ronment, and lauded the public-sector
administrative reform. It noted that
functional reviews for the depart m e n t s
of Finance, Treasury, Prime Minister
and National Executive Council, Per-
sonnel Management, Foreign Affairs,
and the National Fisheries Authority
had been completed.
The Australian government–owned
Export Finance and Insurance Corpo-
ration concluded that the PNG econ-
omy was on the verge of “terminal
decline” as Morauta had failed to
avert budgetary and external liquidity
problems. It particularly feared that
public debt (k8 billion) would become
unsustainable in the long run if no
new foreign capital flows were found.
However, it also accepted that the
prime minister deserved credit for
keeping the economy afloat through
stabilization and structural adjust-
ment programs.
At the end of 2001, one got the
feeling that the future of PNG as a
viable state was critically dependent
on the kind of political leadership the
voters would e n l i st a f t er t he June 2 0 0 2
national election, one not simply in
the category of being a lesser evil.
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Va n uat u
Vanuatu experienced another change
of government as a result of a no-
confidence motion in 2001. While no-
confidence motions have formed part
of the political landscape in Vanuatu
in recent years, what made this event
extraordinary was the involvement of
the Supreme Court in the parliamen-
t a ry wrangles. These events have dom-
inated politics in Vanuatu in 2001.
At the beginning of the year the
government was a coalition headed by
Barak Sope of the Melanesian Pro g re s-
sive Party. The other main partners in
this coalition were the Union of Mod-
erate Parties, the National United
Party, and the Vanuatu Republican
Party. This government had come to
power in November of 1999, when
then Prime Minister Donald Kalpokas
of the Vanua‘aku Party resigned in
o rd e r to a v o i d a n o - c o n f i d e n ce m o t i o n .
Dissatisfaction with the Sope-led
government had been growing, due in
large part to its dealings with Ama-
rendra Nand Ghosh. Ghosh, a Thai
businessman, came to attention in
April of 2000. It was around this time
that, soon after giving the Vanuatu
government 10 million vatu for disas-
ter relief, he was appointed Honorary
Consul to Thailand and awarded
honorary citizenship. This resulted 
in complaints that he had effectively
bought a diplomatic passport.
Throughout the year his business
interests in Vanuatu and involvement
with various politicians increased,
raising some concerns. Toward the
end of 2 0 0 0 G h o s h ’s involvement with
the Vanuatu government took a some-
what bizarre turn as he presented the
country with a gift of a ruby allegedly
worth u s$174 million. The stated
purpose of this gift was “that it could
be used as collateral to get financial
assistance” (TP, 6 Dec 2000). No
independent valuation of t h is ru by w a s
available however, nor was it available
to be inspected by customs officers.
The ruby’s valuation on Australian
customs declaration forms was only
u s$40,000, casting further doubt on
its value.
In March of 2001 dealings between
Ghosh and the Vanuatu government
took a further strange turn when it
was revealed that the government had
signed an agreement with Ghosh that
apparently would give him bank guar-
antees worth u s$10 million over a
period of ten years. As a further part
of this agreement a Hong Kong–based
company, Sun Jewel group, who had
agreed to buy the ruby for u s$175
million, was to manufacture gold and
silver coins for sale by the Reserve
Bank of Vanuatu. The agreement pro-
vided that Ghosh would pay the costs
associated with the manufacturing
and transport of these coins, and the
Reserve Bank of Vanuatu would keep
all proceeds associated with the coins.
This agreement was signed despite
doubts expressed by the governor of
the reserve bank as to the legality of
such actions (p i r , 23 Mar 2001).
Another factor that contributed 
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to the vote of no confidence was the
deportation of Marc Neil Jones, pub-
lisher of the Trading Post newspaper,
on 19 January 2001. Jones was
deported from Vanuatu for publishing
stories about the relationship between
Ghosh and the government. He
returned to Vanuatu after two days,
following an interim order by then
Acting Chief Justice Lunabeck that
allowed him back into the country
until the legality of his deportation
could be resolved in court. The matter
was finally settled out of court, with
Jones receiving about 1.4 million vatu
in costs and personal compensation in
December of 2001 (Jones, pers comm,
1 Feb 2002). The deportation raised
widespread concerns about the gov-
ernment’s lack of respect for consti-
tutionally enshrined human rights. It
also effectively raised the question of
what the government had to hide in
its dealings with Ghosh.
Soon after the bank guarantees
agreement was signed, the Union of
Moderate Parties left the coalition
g o v e rnment and joined the opposition,
led by Edward Natapei of the Vanua-
‘aku Party. On 26 March the opposi-
tion, now having a majority in parlia-
ment, submitted to the Speaker, Paul
Ren Tari, a notice of a motion of no
confidence in Prime Minister Sope.
The Speaker ruled that this notice was
in order and placed it on the agenda
to be debated on Tuesday, 3 April, as
part of the First Ordinary Session of
Parliament.
On 2 7 M a rch the government with-
drew all government bills intended for
debate during the session. Sope then
announced that the Council of Minis-
ters, which had met earlier in the day,
had resolved to advise the president
of the Republic of Vanuatu to dissolve
parliament. He further stated that he
would resign if the president declined
to dissolve parliament. The Speaker
then adjourned the sitting of parlia-
ment to the following day.
The president, Father John Bani,
declined to dissolve parliament,
because the motivation for doing so
was to avoid voting on the motion of
no confidence. Parliament therefore
reconvened for normal business on
March 28. Despite his earlier state-
ment, Sope did not resign as prime
minister. As there were no written
questions before parliament, the
Speaker adjourned the sitting to 
4:00 pm on 3 April when parliament
could debate and vote on the motion
of no confidence.
Following the submission of the
vote of no confidence there were alle-
gations that agents of Dinh van Than,
p resident of the National United Part y,
had approached various opposition
members of parliament, attempting to
bribe them to return to the govern-
ment. Stories that opposition members
of parliament were being harassed by
g roups of people, a p p a re n t ly on o rd e r s
from various government supporters,
also circulated (TP, 31 Mar 2001).
When parliament reconvened on 
3 April 2001, the Speaker ruled that
there would be no debate of the
motion because it contained some
typing errors or incorrect references
to the provisions of the Constitution.
As this was the last item on the
agenda, the Speaker then closed the
First Ordinary Session of Parliament.
That day the opposition took two
actions. First they filed suit in the
Supreme Court on the grounds that
the Speaker’s actions in closing the
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First Session of Parliament were
unconstitutional. They also filed a
second motion of no confidence with
the clerk of parliament and issued a
summons to the Speaker to call an
extraordinary session of parliament 
to debate this second motion.
On 6 April Chief Justice Lunabeck
ruled that the closure of parliament
was in breach of Article 43 (2) of the
Constitution, which gives members of
parliament a constitutional right to
debate motions of no confidence, pro-
vided the correct procedures are fol-
lowed. The typing errors or incorrect
references were not sufficient grounds
to prevent debate on the motion, par-
ticularly as it had been accepted for
debate by the Speaker on 26 March.
The court ordered that the Speaker
reconvene parliament forthwith in
order to allow debate on the motion
(Natapei & Ors v Tari No 1, 2001).
During this hearing the irregularities
in the motion were rectified by the
court. After this court ruling (which
upheld the continued validity of the
first motion of no confidence), the
second motion became largely irrele-
vant to the political wrangling.
At 2:00 p m on 6 April parliament
was reconvened, although many of
the members of the Sope government
did not attend or turned up l a t e . W h e n
the session finally commenced the
Speaker suspended parliament until
Tuesday, 10 April. His apparent justi-
fication for doing so was that Stand-
ing Order of Parliament 23 allows for
debate on written motions on Tu e s d a y
afternoons. Although members of the
opposition tried to raise points of
order, the Speaker did not allow any
m e m b er of parliament to speak. O n 1 0
April the Speaker again did not allow
anybody to speak, but adjourned par-
liament until 17 April. The apparent
justification for this action was that
no amendment to the written motion
had been made, so parliament was
adjourned to allow for an amendment
to be made.
The next stage in the drama
occurred on 11 April when the oppo-
sition applied to the Supreme Court
for an order commanding the Speaker
to summon parliament to meet that
day at 2:00 p m to allow debate on
the motion. Chief Justice Lunabeck
found that repeated adjournments of
parliament were unconstitutional, as
they did not allow for the debate of
the no-confidence motion, a right pro-
vided by Article 43 (2). He ordered
that the Speaker summon parliament
to meet at 6:00 p m on 12 April, and
allow parliament time to debate and
vote on the motion. He further found
that the Speaker’s actions constituted
a breach of the court order of 6 April,
and that any failure to comply with
the new order to convene parliament
would be in contempt of court (Nata-
pei & Ors v Tari No 2, 2001).
Parliament was not convened, and
on 13 April contempt proceedings
were initiated. During these proceed-
ings the Speaker apologized for dis-
obeying the court orders and under-
took to reconvene parliament at seven
o’clock that night to allow for debate
of the motion. On this apology the
contempt proceedings were with-
drawn, although the court ordered
that any failure to convene parliament
that evening would result in the
Speaker being immediately arrested
and imprisoned for six months (Nata-
pei & Ors v Tari [Contempt], 2001).
As a further delaying tactic it
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appears that Sope approached the act-
ing commissioner of police seeking to
declare a state of emergency, although
nothing came of this action (p i r, 17
Apr 2001). Parliament finally con-
vened and debated the no-confidence
motion on the evening of 13 April.
Sope was ousted and a coalition
between the Vanua‘aku Party and the
Union of Moderate Parties became the
new government. Edward Natapei of
the Vanua‘aku Party became the new
prime minister, with Serge Vohor of
the Union of Moderate Parties
appointed his deputy prime minister.
With the vote of no confidence
finally settled, the First Ordinary Ses-
sion of Parliament of 2 0 0 1 came to an
end, although this was not to mark
the end of parliamentary turmoil. The
Speaker, still Mr Paul Ren Tari, sum-
moned parliament to meet in the First
Extraordinary Session of 2001 on 3
May, to debate various government
bills and motions. On the morning of
3 May no opposition members of par-
liament attended, p reventing a q u o ru m
f rom being form e d. T h at a f t e rn o on t h e
boycott continued, with only four
opposition members of parliament
attending. As a result parliament was
adjourned until 7 May. On 7 May
there was full attendance in parlia-
ment. Following opening formalities
the Speaker proceeded to suspend six
government members of parliament,
including Prime Minister Edward
Natapei and Deputy Prime Minister
Serge Vohor. The Speaker’s stated
reason for the suspension was that the
earlier petitions to the Supreme Court
were breaches of the Standing Orders
of Parliament. At no time were the 
six given an opportunity to speak or
question points of order. The six sus-
pended members of parliament then
left, along with the other government
members of parliament. They almost
immediately filed a constitutional
petition with the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile in parliament, after a brief
adjournment, the Speaker closed the
first Extraordinary Session, although
less than half of the members were
present. This raised a further legal
issue of whether the session could be
closed when parliament was inquo-
rate.
On 8 May, at the request of the
Speaker, the clerk of parliament issued
notice of the Second Extraordinary
Session for 2001. Included on this
agenda were a motion of no confi-
dence in Prime Minister Natapei and
a motion to suspend all twenty-seven
government members of parliament
from three Extraordinary Sessions of
Parliament and two Ordinary Sessions
of Parliament. Meanwhile the S u p re m e
Court commenced the hearing on the
validity of the suspension of the mem-
bers o f parliament and a s s o c i a t e d m a t-
ters. On 12 May the Court ruled that
the suspension was invalid, because it
prevented the six suspended members
from legitimately exercising their law-
ful duties and responsibilities as mem-
bers of parliament. Additionally, their
having being given no opportunity to
speak infringed various constitution-
ally enshrined human rights. The clo-
sure of the First Extraordinary Session
of Parliament was also ruled to be
invalid, as parliament was inquorate
and various other constitutional
provisions were also breached. Chief
Justice Lunabeck further ordered the
Speaker to reconvene parliament on
the morning of 14 May to continue
the First Extraordinary Session (Nata-
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pei & Ors v Tari & Ors [Reasons for
Judgment], 2001; Natapei & Ors v
Tari & Ors [Orders], 2001).
The Speaker, however, chose to
ignore this order, and signed a state-
ment to this effect. Early on Tuesday
m o rning, 15 M a y, he was arrested and
charged with making a seditious state-
ment. First Deputy Speaker Irene
Bongnaim and Second Deputy Speaker
Henry Iauko were also arrested and
charged with complicity in making a
s e d i t i o us s t a t e m e n t . P a r l i a m e nt s at t h a t
d a y, but only after a w o r k er b ro ke i n t o
the parliament building, as Paul Ren
Tari refused to release the keys. At
this meeting Tari was relieved of the
position of Speaker and former Prime
Minister Donald Kalpokas was voted
in to take his place. This left the gov-
ernment with twenty-six members,
compared to the opposition with
twenty-five members (TP, 16 May
2001). While there were some doubts
whether the government could survive
with such a slim majority, a n d o n o c c a-
sion Sope did discuss the tabling of a
no-confidence motion (TP, 1 Sept, 13
Dec 2001), this government remained
intact for the rest of the year.
Various legal issues and challenges
from these events continued through-
out the year, although they ultimately
had little impact on the government.
The sedition charges were finally
quashed by the Supreme Court in
November because of a legal techni-
cality: Article 27 (2) of the Constitu-
tion prevents any member of parlia-
ment from being arrested or
prosecuted during a session. As the
S u p reme Court had ruled that the clo-
s u re of the First Extraordinary Session
of Parliament on 7 May was invalid
and of no e ffect, parliament was in
session at the time of the arrest and it
was therefore unconstitutional (TP, 1
Dec 2 0 0 1). On 29 October a chal-
lenge to the decision of 12 May was
heard and dismissed by the Court of
Appeal (Tari & Ors v Natapei & O r s ,
2001).
One of the first acts of the new
government was to sever relations
with Ghosh. His diplomatic titles were
canceled and he was requested to sur-
render his diplomatic passport and the
four passports issued to staff members
at his office in Bangkok. The ruby,
however, remained in Vanuatu (TP,
12 May 2001).
The remainder of the year has been
fairly quiet, although there have been
some incidents of note. More prison-
ers were released as part of Indepen-
dence celebrations, despite public out-
cries over the practice following an
incident last year when a released
prisoner was responsible for the kill-
ing of a man (TP, 1 July 2001). The
commencement of the Customary
Land Tribunal Act on 10 December
marks the culmination of a review of
land administration begun in early
2000. The object of the act is to pro-
vide for a system based on custom to
resolve disputes about customary land.
Although Vanuatu’s land all reverted
to customary ownership at the time of
Independence, there has never been an
effective procedure or administrative
body for handling disputes. By estab-
lishing a number of land tribunals,
each covering small “custom areas”
with largely homogeneous customs,
this act will hopefully address what
has been a significant difficulty with
the law and land administration in
Vanuatu.
It has also been good to note that
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dishonest behavior among politicians
and within the public service is begin-
ning to result in criminal pro s e c u t i o n s .
In the middle of the year Deputy Prin-
cipal Immigration Officer John Wai
was found guilty of accepting a bribe
to process residency forms. He was
jailed for the offense for three months
(TP, 4 Aug 2 0 0 1). In November, B a r a k
Sope was charged with forgery related
to two government bank guarantees
signed when he was prime minister.
One of these guarantees is for u s$18
million and the other for u s$5 mil-
lion. Ghosh, whose name had been
mentioned in connection with the
guarantees, has denied any involve-
ment. An Australian, Edmond Gallea,
is being investigated with regard to
this matter. Gallea, who has appar-
ently been given a Vanuatu diplomatic
passport, has been involved in a large
cattle deal in Santo, the details of
which are still somewhat unclear 
(TP, 1 7 Nov 2 0 0 1) . S o p e is n o s t r a n g e r
to dubious bank guarantee dealings,
having been implicated in ombuds-
man’s reports in relation to bank
guarantees worth us$100 million
given to Peter Swanson in 1996
(Vanuatu Ombudsman 2001). The
preliminary hearing in this matter 
is set for February 2002.
Finally, the ombudsman has been
permitted to continue an action com-
menced in 1997 to recover ex gratia
payments and compensation payments
made to various politicians in 1993
and 1994 (Korman v The Ombuds-
man, 2001). This proceeding was
started by the previous ombudsman
under the authority of the Ombuds-
man’s Act 1995, which gave the
ombudsman limited rights of enforce-
ment in court if the recommendations
contained in public reports were
ignored. The original hearings were
interrupted by attempts to repeal the
Ombudsman’s Act 1995, and by vari-
ous other attacks on the ombudsman
of the time. Eventually the 1995 act
was repealed and the new act, which
commenced in 1 9 9 9, does not give the
ombudsman any powers of enforce-
ment. This action is therefore an
anachronism, but is nonetheless wel-
come as an attempt to make Va n u a t u ’s
politicians accountable for abuses of
power.
a n i ta jow i t t
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West Pa p ua
The gap continued to widen between
Indonesian central government rhet-
oric and performance on the ground
in its troubled eastern province of
Irian Jaya during 2 0 0 1. If carrots were
proffered to the province, in the form
of a law on “Special Autonomy” that
is due to be implemented in 2002,
sticks were still wielded vigorously by
the government’s security apparatus,
with the police and military acting in
concert with the judiciary. Among the
e l e m e n t s on o ff e r i n t h e S p e c i al A u t o n-
omy package is an apparent conces -
sion on use of the name “Papua” for
the province, but the failure to satisfy
a widely voiced Papuan preference for
“West Papua” and the retention in
official usage of the alternative but
deeply unpopular “Irian Jaya” (Great
or Victorious Irian) are symptomatic
of a continued reluctance on the part
of government to engage seriously in
dialogue with its Papuan citizens.
The fall of President Suharto in
May 1 9 98 h ad u s h e red in a s h o rt - l i v e d
“Papuan Spring,” a brief eighteen-
month period during which civilian
political expression in Papua flour-
ished and calls for independence were
relatively freely voiced. A formal dia-
l o g ue held in Jakarta in F e b ru a ry 1 9 9 9
between President Habibie and a team
of a hundred Papuan representatives
alerted the government to the depth
of pro-independence sentiment in
Papua. This sentiment then found
more public expression in the form
of two mass meetings in Jayapura, a
Convention or Musyawarah Besar in
February 2000, and a Congress in
May–June 2000. The Congress,
dubbed the “Second Papuan Con-
gress” in acknowledgement of the
Papuan Congress of 1961, issued a
number of ambitious declarations,
each of them unacceptable to Jakarta:
a demand that Jakarta recognize the
unilateral declaration of independence
issued by the first Papuan Congress
on 1 December 1961; a repudiation
of the 1962 New York Agreement and
the subsequent 1969 “Act of Free
Choice” or p e p e r a which, in the eyes
of the United Nations, saw former
Dutch New Guinea formally incor-
porated within Indonesia; a rejection
of central government plans to carve
Papua into three separate provinces; 
a fiat issued to the leadership of the
C o n g ress to seek international support
for the cause of independence; and a
call for the immediate involvement of
the United Nations in a transfer of
powers to an independent Papuan
state.
A panel of Papuan leaders, the
Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium
Dewan Papua or p d p), emerged from
t he S e c o n d C o n g re s s, h e a d ed by C h a i r-
man Theys Eluay and Vice Chairm a n
Tom Beanal. Theys, an elected chief
from Lake Sentani, had formerly
enjoyed a close relationship with
Jakarta but had developed a some-
what ambivalent position since 1998
as an outspoken advocate of indepen-
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dence while maintaining close per-
sonal and business relationships with
various military officers. Tom Beanal,
leader of the Amungme community in
the area of the Freeport mine, was
perhaps more widely respected as a
genuine champion of Papuan rights,
but early in 2000 he had decided to
accept a position on the board of
Freeport Indonesia.
Under the presidency of Abdur-
rahman Wahid, elected in November
1999, the Papuan Presidium Council
and its supporters enjoyed an unpre c e-
d e n t e d latitude of political movement
and expression. Across Papua, previ-
ously banned “Morning Star” flags
associated with the independence
movements were raised on 1 Decem-
ber 1999, and local community secu-
rity posts (posko) established. Wahid’s
political and substantial financial sup-
port for the Second Congress played 
a part in his fall from power in July
2001, when Wahid was replaced by
his strongly nationalist vice president,
Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati’s
new cabinet restored hard-line nation-
alists and former generals to key posi-
tions, notably Gen. (ret.) Susilo Bam-
bang Yudhoyono as Coordinating
Minister for Security and Political
Affairs, Gen. (ret.) Hari Subarno as
Home Affairs Minister, and Lt. Gen.
(ret.) Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriy-
ono as the head of the new National
Intelligence Bureau. Under their direc -
tion, the hard-won concessions of
provinces such as Aceh and Papua
have systematically been rolled back
in a return to the military dominance
of regional planning and administra-
tion that characterized the 1970s and
early 1980s.
This process was a l re a dy under way
prior to Megawati’s presidency. On 
8 June 2000, directly in response to
the Papuan Congress of May–June, a
meeting was called by the Ministry of
the Interior’s Directorate for National
Unity and Public Protection at the
Matoa Hotel in downtown Jayapura.
Those present represented all of the
intelligence agencies operating in
Papua, including the local intelligence
heads from the Special Forces (Kopas-
sus) and the elite Regional Reserve
(Kostrad). The meeting outlined what
it interpreted to be a solidifying con-
spiracy among Papuan leaders, and
proposed a series of possible govern-
ment responses, both public and clan-
destine. The twenty-three-page min-
utes reporting the findings of the
meeting to Minister Hari Subarno
was subsequently leaked to human
rights nongovernment organizations.
Attempts by Minister Yudhoyono and
others to deny that the “Matoa” doc-
ument was genuine were undermined
by Minister Subarno who, when ques-
tioned, admitted that the meeting had
indeed taken place and observed sim-
ply that there had not been adequate
funding to pursue the plans outlined
in the report.
In a diagram entitled “Papuan
Political Conspiracy,” the Matoa doc-
ument maps pro-independence cells
(fraksi), each linked to a central axis,
and identifies some thirty-eight lead-
ing individuals by name. Those listed
include almost every notable Papuan,
from known commanders of the Free
Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka or o p m), through church
and n g o leaders, to the Jakarta-
appointed Governor Jaap Salossa. The
notion that these individuals might act
in concert is absurd, though the suspi-
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cion that they share a common hope
for eventual independence is more
plausible. The report set out a com-
prehensive plan of action for govern-
ment agencies, including diplomatic
initiatives designed to counter the
Papuan Presidium Council’s inter-
national activities, fast-tracking of
economic development programs, 
the promotion of official histories of
Papua’s integration into the Republic,
the creation of “civil defense” and
“people’s resistance” groups (or mili-
tias), the generation of a legal frame-
work to cover repressive action, and
the prosecution of strong sanctions
against the leaders of the “Papuan
Conspiracy.”
Certainly the broader intentions of
the Matoa document appear to have
informed government responses to
independence sentiments since mid-
2000. On the morning of 8 October
2000 a well-planned assault by com-
bined security forces on Papuan
posko centers in the Wamena Valley
that were flying the Morning Star flag
announced an end to the earlier toler-
ance of political freedoms. Indonesian
migrants were caught in the crossfire
between the Wamena communities
and the police and military, and as
many as thirty-seven Papuans and
migrants were killed. The killing of
the migrants, some of them teachers
whose houses had been used as sniper
posts by the security forces, made
headline news nationally. Preempting
the pro-independence ceremonies on 
1 December 2000, five of the p d p
leaders, including Theys Eluay, were
arrested on charges of treason, and in
e a ch of t he re g i o n al c e n t e rs f l a g - r a i s i n g
ceremonies were brutally interrupted.
Clashes in Fak-fak, Sorong, Mano-
kwari, Tiom, and Jakarta resulted in
several deaths and multiple arrests on
charges of subversion. Many of those
arrested during this period in Jaya-
pura, Wamena, Jakarta, and elsewhere
have been held under arrest for con-
siderable periods of time and, even
when released, live under the threat 
of having charges laid against them.
The government’s diplomatic offen-
sive was pursued with equal eff i c i e n c y,
and the Papuan Presidium Council
found itself progressively cut off from
international forums and avenues for
support. The Presidium’s success in
gaining observer status at the Pacific
Islands Forum in 2000 was not
repeated in the August 2001 Forum
meeting. Nauru, as the Forum host,
had actively supported West Papua
independence at the United Nations
as well as at the 2000 Forum, but in
2001 withheld visas for p d p represen-
tatives while welcoming an official
Indonesian government team. At the
Forum, the government’s Papuan
spokesman, the State Minister for
Accelerated Development in Eastern
Indonesia, Manuel Kaisiepo, declared
that human rights violations in West
Papua were a thing of the past (see
below for evidence to the contrary).
Australia and Papua New Guinea
completed this reversal of fortune 
for the Papuan Presidium Council by
limiting reference to West Papua in
the Forum Communiqué to a simple
expression of “concern about violence
and loss of life,” and welcoming
Jakarta’s proposals for Special
Autonomy.
The future of a negotiated settle-
ment between Jakarta and Papua
revolves around the question of
autonomy. Autonomy, in the form
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of a degree of control over resource
benefits and other local revenues and
administrative functions, had been
offered by President Habibie to all of
the country’s regencies, thus bypass-
ing the provinces and undermining
their ability to pose a real challenge to
Jakarta. In the two cases of Aceh and
Papua, a “special” form of provincial
autonomy was proposed, in order to
counter separatist sentiment. Two
competing drafts for the bill on Spe-
cial Autonomy were brought to the
national House of Representatives
(d p r- r i) for consideration. The first
had been prepared unilaterally by the
Ministry of Home Affairs, with little
or no Papuan input. Although this
draft was endorsed by the provincial
House of Representatives (d p r d
Tingkat I) in Jayapura, it was ulti-
mately rejected by the commission
charged with presenting a draft to the
national House. The second draft was
put together in Jayapura by a team of
Papuan academics and provincial gov-
ernment officials appointed by Gover-
nor Jaap Salossa, and represented a
much more serious attempt to find
some common ground between the
positions of the Papuan Presidium
Council and Jakarta. After lengthy
negotiations between the House and
the Governor’s team, the Papuan draft
was accepted as the basis for the bill
in June 2001, but heavily reworked to
eliminate all reference to the possibil-
ity of a referendum on Papua’s future,
and to emphasize Papua’s role as an
integral part of the Republic of Indo-
nesia. The bill was formally endorsed
by the House on 22 October, and
plans announced for the formal pre-
sentation of the law by the president
to the governor in Jayapura on 22
December.
The most generous provisions in
the new Law on Special Autonomy or
Otonomi Khusus for Papua relate to
the redirection of resource revenues,
allocating 70 percent of oil and gas 
to Papua, together with 80 percent 
of other natural resource revenues,
including mining, forestry, and fish-
eries (though some doubt remains
over the precise arrangements for
mining), and an ongoing 2 percent of
the national general allocation fund.
Given the presence in Papua of both
Freeport’s Grasberg copper/gold mine
and British Petroleum’s Tangguh
natural gas field (see below), this is
expected to result in a doubling of the
provincial budget of previous years.
On most other matters the final bill
proved less flexible. The powers to
appoint a Commission on Human
Rights and a Commission for Truth
and Reconciliation, and to control the
deployment and activities of the police
and army, are all retained by Jakarta.
Although provision is made for the
establishment of traditional courts
(Pengadilan Adat), these are to be sub-
o rdinate to the national court system,
which will continue to be regulated
by Jakarta. Crucially, no place was
found in the final bill for popular ref-
erendums on changes to the Special
Autonomy Law or, as proposed in the
governor’s draft, on the fate of Special
Autonomy after a trial period of five
years. Although a symbolic concession
is made on use of the name “Papua,”
the status of other symbols of Papuan
i d e n t i t y, such as the Morning Star flag,
remains uncertain. Permission is
granted to use local symbols (flags
and anthems) but these can only be
“cultural expressions and cannot be
used as independence symbols.”
The key to Jakarta’s strategy is the
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offer to Papua of revenues from the
various “mega-projects,” including
the Freeport copper-gold mine, British
Petroleum’s natural gas project at
Tangguh, b h p-Billiton’s nickel pros-
pect on Gag Island, and the plans for
an industrial park centered on the
Mamberamo hydroelectric project.
Freeport’s production was restored to
full capacity in January 2001 after the
company forced through an agre e m e n t
with community leaders on dumping
its overburden in Lake Wanagon, the
scene of two massive accidents, the
second being fatal for four Freeport
workers. In April, Mama Yosepha
Alomang, an Amungme leader who
has campaigned actively against Free-
port, was awarded the Goldman Envi-
ronmental Prize in San Francisco for
her determined defense of the rights
of the Amungme and Kamoro com-
munities indigenous to the area of
Freeport’s contract of work. Freeport
countered this reversal by announcing
details of a formal Memorandum of
Understanding, signed with Amungme
and Kamoro re p resentatives, establish-
i n g a trust fund for the two communi-
ties, in an attempt to make amends
after previous, poorly implemented
attempts at compensation. In August
t he n a t i o n al e n v i ro n m e n t a l n o n g o vern-
ment organization, wa l h i, secured
an inaugural, if limited, victory in a
Jakarta court against Freeport on the
matter of insufficient disclosure about
the Wanagon accidents. British Petro-
leum’s massive Tangguh natural gas
project in Bintuni Bay is likely to
proceed to production in 2004, and
will ultimately produce even more
revenue for the province than Free-
port. However, plans for a joint ven-
ture nickel project on Gag Island
involving b h p-Billiton, Falconbridge,
and Aneka Tambang were suspended
when Falconbridge withdrew, citing
the obstruction posed to the project
by legislation banning mining in
National Protection Forest areas.
Despite optimistic announcements by
government officials, both national
a n d p ro v i n c i a l, little headway h as b e e n
made with the formal components of
the Mamberamo project, amid doubts
over the technical feasibility of a large
dam in a dynamic river system, and
uncertainty over the scale of environ-
mental impacts and the political future
of Papua. Nevertheless, numerous
timber and oil palm projects have
gained a foothold in the Mamberamo
area, riding on the coattails of the
larger project.
Papuan disappointment with the
Special Autonomy legislation focuses
on Jakarta’s mistaken assumption that
the financial benefits of autonomy
will ultimately compensate for the
lack of political freedoms and per-
sonal security. A “paralyzing polariza-
tion” of debate within Papua, which
associates “M” (Merdeka, or immedi-
ate Independence) with true Papuan
aspirations, and “O” (Otonomi, or
Autonomy) with submission to the
will of Jakarta, had previously under-
mined attempts to discuss moderate
positions at the Papuan Congress.
Even before the details of the final bill
had been released, Special Autonomy
had been rejected out of hand by the
Papuan Presidium Council and vari-
ous o p m spokesmen on the grounds
that it fell short of demands for a
referendum and had involved little or
no dialogue with Papuan community
leaders. An early attempt by the gov-
ernor’s team to “socialize” their draft,
a t a seminar in Jayapura on 2 8 M a rc h ,
was disrupted by student protests and
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the walkout of many of the regional
representatives gathered together to
discuss the draft. A heavy-handed
attempt by police to quell these pro-
tests resulted in the death through
injury of one of the protestors. As an
observer remarked, if the academics
of the governor’s team had failed to
adequately socialize the concept of
special autonomy among their own
students, there could be little hope 
for success before the broader Papuan
public. Papuan supporters of the con-
cept of special autonomy (if not the
final form of the bill), including the
governor, members of the local and
national legislatures, senior academics,
bureaucrats, and church leaders, have
argued that the new law, however
compromised, is a necessary first step
towards satisfying Papuan expecta-
tions.
Levels of violence in Papua have
often reflected the personal attitudes
and ambitions of provincial comman-
ders, and there was an air of cautious
optimism following the appointment
in late 2000 of Maj.-Gen. Tonny
Rompis, an apparent moderate who
had put the case for a persuasive
rather than re p ressive response to calls
for Papuan independence. His death
in a plane crash in the Central High-
lands on 8 January, along with eight
others including the provincial police
chief, F X Soemardi, and the Speaker
of the pro v i n c i a l p a r l i a m e n t, N a t h a n i e l
Kaiway, was a severe blow to advo-
cates for peace on both sides. In place
of Rompis the army appointed Maj.-
Gen. Mahidin Simbolon, a Special
Forces veteran, famous for his intelli-
gence work that resulted in the
capt u re of F retilin leader X a n a n a G u s-
mao, and for his role in the organiza-
tion of East Timorese “militias.” In
contrast, the new police chief, Brig.-
Gen. I Made Magku Pastika, has
proved to be an unusually liberal
appointment.
Late in 2000, Minister for Defense
Mahfud had declared the govern-
ment’s intention to return to a “secu-
rity” approach in its handling of A c e h ,
Maluku, and We s t Papua, and a major
redeployment of fifty-one battalions,
or 40 percent of the entire army, to
these outer provinces ensued. Esti-
mates of additional troops sent to
Papua during 2001 ranged from the
army’s own figure of an increase to
8,000 “nonstructural” elite police and
military, to observers’ estimates of
15,000–20,000 new troops. Mega-
wati’s first cabinet meeting nominated
the resolution of the conflicts in Aceh
and Papua as its most pressing goal,
and in her inaugural address on 16
August the new President apologized
to Papua for the suffering endured 
as a consequence of “inappropriate
national policies.” During the follow-
ing months, however, strongly nation-
alist policies on Papua prevailed,
implemented largely through the
agency of the military.
Thus far, the creation of civilian
“militias” has been limited to urban
centers, particularly in the western
parts of the province, at Fak-fak and
Sorong, where the military have
attempted to pit indigenous Moslem
and Christian communities against
each other. There have also been sev-
eral reports during 2001 of the arrival
in Papua of well-armed and gener-
ously funded Laskar Jihad militants
from the conflict in Maluku.
In Papua, as elsewhere in Indo-
n e s i a, t h e a rmy supplements its income
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through a wide variety of business
operations. The proliferation of army
and police units in Papua, and the
scope for rivalry over logging, alluvial
mining, and smuggling opportunities,
has led to a corresponding rise in
clashes between different units. A fire-
fight and grenade assault involving
police and military took place at Serui
on Yapen Island on 27 August leaving
two dead and six injured, and a run-
ning war between police and soldiers
in the Nabire area has claimed the
lives of at least two police.
A rmed resistance to Indonesian ru l e
on the part of the Free Papua Move-
ment appears to have increased during
2001. Although internal strife contin-
ues to dog the movement, with fatal
clashes reported from o p m camps in
Vanimo in mid-July, individual com-
manders and their units have been
able to move with surprising freedom
and temerity within Papua. Attacks
on police or military posts, or on
Indonesian migrant workers, were
re p o rt ed f rom the are as of B e t af / S a rm i
(3 February and 27 August), Wasior
(31 March and 13 June), Timika (4
April and 23 September), Bintuni (28
August), Waropen (16 November),
and Kimaam (28 November). The
township of Ilaga in the Central High-
lands was overrun by the Free Papua
Movement for five days, from 28 Sep-
tember until the army reestablished
control on 2 October. This last event
was sufficiently embarrassing for
Maj.-Gen. Simbolon to sack eight of
his senior commanders, including his
assistants for intelligence and terri-
torial affairs. Military operations in
response to opm activity, particularly
in the Wasior area, in Manokwari
Regency, and in the Betaf and Sarmi
areas of the north coast, drew harsh
criticism from human rights observ e r s .
Indiscriminate “sweeping” operations
conducted by army and elite police
(b r i m o b) units in these two areas
resulted in numerous reports of arbi-
trary detention, torture, and execu-
tion, and forced large numbers of
civilians to flee to the surrounding
forests.
Two hostage crises during 2001
briefly dominated national, if not
international news. The first involved
the 16 January kidnapping by an opm
unit, led by Willem Onde, of a group
of eighteen workers from the Korean-
owned logging company, pt Tunas
Korindo, operating in the Asiki area
in the Merauke re g e n c y. The crisis was
resolved on 7 F e b ru a ry with the re t u rn
of the last hostages, among them two
Korean company officials, but not
before grave doubts had been raised
in the media about the nature of the
kidnapping. Onde had long been in
close negotiation with local Kopassus
commanders, and was regarded with
suspicion by Papuan observers and
other opm commanders. Among
Onde’s demands was a request for 
the military to pick up his tab at a bar
that he frequented in Merauke. The
“crisis” over, Onde was flown by the
m i l i t a ry to Jakarta, where he met with
parliamentarians to press his case. In
September, after his return to Papua,
two bodies with their hands bound
and gunshot wounds to their chests
were retrieved from rivers near
Merauke, and identified as those of
Onde and his lieutenant, Johannes
Tumeng. Few seem to have questioned
the general wisdom that Onde’s “tab”
with the military had expired. Then
on 7 June, two Belgian men, Philippe
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Simon and Johan v an D en E y n d e, w e re
taken hostage by an o p m unit at the
village of Paluga near Ilaga. Although
the Belgians appear to have been tour-
ists with an interest in documentary
films, their easy passage through the
military posts in Ilaga in search of 
the Free Papua Movement aroused
the unit’s suspicions, leading to their
kidnapping. Two church mediators,
Benny Giay and Theo van den Broek,
eventually secured their release,
unharmed, on 16 August. 
In December 2000 a group of
approximately 400 refugees, mostly
Highlanders fleeing police persecution
in the Jayapura area, crossed into the
Vanimo area of Papua New Guinea,
but failed to gain acknowledgment of
refugee status from the PNG govern-
ment. The UN High Commission on
Refugees had previously announced
its plans to withdraw from all of the
refugee camps by the end of 2001,
and the Catholic church, left to bear
much of the burden, also threatened
to withdraw if government support
was not forthcoming. In March, a
PNG police riot squad attack on one
of the Vanimo camps left as many as
fifteen people injured. The irony of
the PNG government’s willingness to
receive Afghan and Iraqi refugees in
support of Australia’s “Pacific Solu-
tion” did not escape observers on
either side of the border.
The event that dominated the news
from Papua at the end of 2001 was
the assassination on 11 November of
p d p Chairman Theys Eluay, a murder
that remained officially unsolved by
the year’s end. After a t t e n d i n g a d i n n e r
at the Special Forces (Kopassus) base
at Hamadi, in Jayapura, Theys and his
driver Ari Masoka were driving back
to his home in Sentani when his car
was forced off the road by another
vehicle. Theys was abducted by at
least four men, but Ari escaped, call-
ing Theys’s wife to tell her of the kid-
napping by “straight hairs” (ie, non-
Papuans). Shaken, Ari asked a passing
bus to drop him at the Kopassus base,
where he then disappeared. Theys was
discovered dead the following morn-
ing, with his hands bound, seated in
the driver’s seat of his car (though he
could not drive), which had been
pushed into a ravine along a road
leading to the PNG border. The
autopsy found no marks of strangula-
tion, but declared that Theys had died
of a “lack of oxygen,” presumably
through suffocation with a plastic
bag, a hallmark technique of Kopas-
sus killings. Despite high tension and
some sporadic riots, calm prevailed,
and Theys was buried in Sentani on
17 November, in a ceremony attended
by a crowd estimated at more than
10,000.
Police enquiries very quickly came
to a standstill and a report issued on
13 December by a local human rights
organization, the Institute for Human
Rights Studies and Advocacy
(ElsHAM), made clear the reasons 
for this impasse. All the indications
were that the killing was the work 
of Kopassus, who had badly botched
their attempt to cover their tracks.
The vehicle had passed through
numerous military and police check-
points to reach the point where it was
found, and forensic evidence (includ-
ing matching paint on Theys’s vehicle
and a Kopassus vehicle, and finger-
print evidence from Kopassus troops
who were interviewed by the police)
was supported by the testimonies of
numerous eyewitnesses. Kopassus
silence on the whereabouts of Ari
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Masoka has only strengthened the
case against them. Despite initial
protestations to the contrary—Maj.-
Gen. Simbolon, known for his pride
in the dictum “No order, no action,”
denied the involvement of any troops
under his command and insisted at
first that Theys had died of a heart
attack—the combined weight of the
police report, a public statement by
provincial Police Chief Made Pastika
linking Kopassus to the murder, and
the findings of an internal military
investigation, finally forced an admis-
sion by Army chief Endriartono
Sutarto that troops may have been
involved. 
Jakarta, now in damage-limitation
mode, has sent a notionally indepen-
dent commission of enquiry to settle
the case, but the composition of the
team, with several active and retired
military and police officers, has done
little to inspire confidence. The find-
ings of the team have been neatly
anticipated by government ministers
who have aired the likelihood that the
murder was a criminal action on the
part of rogue elements of the military,
acting independently of command
structures. Along with Willem Onde,
Theys had been identified as a mem-
ber of the “Papuan Conspiracy” in the
Matoa document, and observers have
suggested that their murders mark the
initial steps in a systematic campaign
of elimination of local leaders similar
to that being conducted in Aceh.
Since the assassination of Theys,
death threats have been issued over
the phone to other “Papuan Conspir-
ators,” including p d p Secretary-Gen-
eral Thaha Al-Hamid and ElsHAM
Director Johannes Bonay.
Events during 2001 offer scant
grounds for optimism about Papua’s
immediate future. There is little pros-
pect of genuine dialogue between
Jakarta and Papua under a Megawati
administration, and no indication that
the other major parties are likely to be
any more accommodating of Papuan
aspirations. Much hangs on the speed
with which the Special Autonomy leg-
islation is implemented and the man-
ner in which this is achieved, but in 
a climate of diminished government
administrative capacity, to say noth-
ing of will, the chances of an increase
in levels of Papuan frustration appear
very high. The most immediate prob-
lem for the government, obviously, is
finding a credible solution to the ques-
tions surrounding the assassination of
Theys Eluay, but little in the govern-
ment’s handling of this case thus far
suggests that it will succeed in swaying
Papuan opinion.
Having cancelled her trip to Papua
in late December to present the Special
Autonomy legislation, P re s i d e n t Mega-
wati instead attended a 29 December
military parade in Jakarta at which
she declared, “We are suddenly aware
. . . of the need for forc e to p ro t e ct o u r
beloved nation and motherland from
breaking up.” “But with the laws of
Indonesia as your guide,” she added t o
the assembled soldiers, “you can do
your duty without worrying about
being involved in human rights a b u s e s .
Do everything without doubts.”
Among the senior officers present was
Maj.-Gen. Simbolon and before them
a company of non-Papuan soldiers
who, dressed in grass skirts and with
their bare chests crudely daubed with
mud, shook spears and enacted
Jakarta’s necessary fantasy of savage
and uncontrollable Papuans.
chris ba l l a r d
476 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002
R e f e re n c e s
Cenderawasih Pos. Daily. Jayapura.
Down to Earth. Monthly. London.
Far Eastern Economic Review. Weekly,
Hong Kong.
Jakarta Post. Daily, Jakarta.
Kabar Irian. Website 
< www.kabar-irian.com >
Kompas. Daily. Jakarta.
Suara Pembaruan. Daily. Jakarta.
Sydney Morning Herald. Daily. Sydney.
TA P O L Bulletin. Monthly. London.
Tifa Papua. Weekly, Jayapura.
Institute for Human Rights Studies and
Advocacy (ElsHAM). 2001. The Abduc-
tion and Assassination of Theys Hiyo
Eluay Was Premeditated and Politically
Motivated. Preliminary Report, issued 
13 December, Jayapura. Translation by
ta p o l , London.
International Crisis Group. 2001. Indone-
sia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya. i c g
Report No. 23. Jakarta and Brussels:
International Crisis Group.
Office for Justice and Peace. 2001. Recent
D e velopments in Papua: Special A u t o n o my
—Its Process and Final Contents. Socio-
Political Notes 5. Jayapura: Office for
Justice and Peace, Diocese of Jayapura.
Van den Broek, Theo, and Alexandra Sza-
lay. 2001. Raising the Morning Star: Six
Months in the Developing Independence
Movement in West Papua. The Journal of
Pacific History 36 (1): 77–92.
